BORDER VIOLENCE AS CRIME
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ABSTRACT
As the violence of borders has increased since the beginning of
the century, advocates have started to employ the language of antiimpunity. This discourse aims to frame border violence as a crime,
often as a mass atrocity. This Article is the first to identify and
critically assess this type of response. It offers a comparative multiregional analysis to analyze the turn to criminal law as it has figured
in attempts to enforce the rights of refugees and migrants. After
defining the anti-impunity project, the Article analyzes antiimpunity in the context of migration to Australia, Europe, and the
United States. It then proceeds to evaluate this trend in light of
recent literature, which has been critical of anti-impunity and “the
turn to criminal law” in human rights. Critics of anti-impunity have
argued, in the context of a broad range of human rights campaigns,
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that the criminal law vocabulary diverts attention from underlying
structural issues, including economic inequality. This Article
presents a defense of the criminal law framing of border violence, as
one instrument within a broader toolbox of strategic litigation, and
of transformative political action. I argue the atrocity framing,
common to contemporary progressive movements around the
world, is an attempt to employ criminal law to counter violence
rooted in global inequality.
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INTRODUCTION

On August 9, 2018, Ben Ferencz, the last surviving prosecutor at
the Nuremberg trials, opined that Donald Trump committed “a
crime against humanity” against migrants and refugees.1 Neither
the 99-year-old lawyer nor the former President of the United States
are alone in their respective roles as the accuser and the accused.
Around the world, advocates have increasingly appealed to
criminal law, including international criminal law, to establish
liability for border violence. Protest movements and progressive
politicians have stressed analogies between contemporary abuses
against migrants and historical mass atrocities—including, but not
limited to, concentration camps. As politicians in many developed
countries introduce cruel measures against migrants, activists have
turned towards criminal law and a discourse of anti-impunity. 2
Celebrities have echoed this discourse on Twitter.3
As a legal program, anti-impunity holds that a central
mechanism of ensuring accountability for gross violations of human
rights is criminal law.4 If domestic institutions fail to hold violators
accountable, an international body should proceed, instead.
Scholars identified a turn to criminal law in human rights in the

1
Mythili Sampathkumar, Last Surviving Prosecutor at Nuremberg Trials Says
Trump’s Family Separation Policy is ‘Crime Against Humanity’, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 16,
2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/trump-bordercrisis-nazis-nuremberg-trial-ben-ferencz-family-separation-migrants-un-a8485606.
html [https://perma.cc/5CNU-3BSD].
2
On anti-impunity generally, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for
International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 421 (2000); Payam Akhavan, Beyond
Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT’L
L. 7, 16 (2001). In the context of migration, see, for example, ANA GONZÁLEZPÁRAMO, THE WIDESPREAD IMPUNITY OVER MIGRANT DEATHS (2017),
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-321-migrant-deaths-impunity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NLN4-W78A]; Ryan Goodman (@rgoodlaw), TWITTER (June 22,
2019, 6:54 PM), https://twitter.com/rgoodlaw/status/1142566649465397250
[https://perma.cc/MQS2-JJYB].
3 See e.g., Marissa J. Lang (@Marissa_Jae), TWITTER (July 16, 2019, 11:46 AM),
https://twitter.com/Marissa_Jae/status/1151234786217857028; Andrea Pitzer
(@andreapitzer),
TWITTER
(June
25,
2019,
5:07
PM),
https://twitter.com/andreapitzer/status/1143626892660097026/photo/1
[https://perma.cc/6G3A-PZDR].
4
See Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1077-78 (2015) (explaining the reasons why early antiimpunity advocates looked to “individual criminal responsibility” to hold human
rights abusers accountable).
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1990s, and criminal law has since become central to human rights.5
Yet anti-impunity goes beyond a set of legal agendas. It also refers
to rhetoric in which gross human rights violations are analogized to
past atrocities. The turn to criminal law is part of a discourse on
mass atrocity, characteristically grounded in the context of war and
authoritarianism, and often advanced under the banner “never
again.”6
This Article offers a comparative multi-regional analysis to
assess the turn to criminal law and to anti-impunity as it has figured
in attempts to enforce the rights of refugees and migrants. Karen
Engle has advanced the critique of anti-impunity in an article titled
Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights. 7
Alongside her co-editors Zinaida Miller and D.M. Davis, she has
also collected critiques of this turn in an illuminating edited volume,
Anti-Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda.8 This Article engages
the critiques of anti-impunity primarily through a consideration of
these sources. Among the various contributions to the latter
collection, I especially spend argumentative energy pushing back
against Samuel Moyn’s essay Anti-Impunity as Deflection of
Argument.9 I believe he raises an important philosophical challenge;
one that is ultimately misguided.
As the turn to criminal law in the protection of refugees and
migrants is still rather inchoate, the scholars involved in this critique
typically do not address refugees and migration.10 At the same time,
this area of human rights has become one of the most divisive in
public opinion in developed countries. 11 This Article, therefore,
Id.
For a description of the rhetorical role of this phrase, see, for example,
Michelle D. Bonner, ‘Never Again’: Transitional Justice and Persistent Police Violence in
Argentina, 8 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 235 passim (2014); Charles Davison, Special
Report, Never Again!!, 26 LAWNOW 32, 35 (2001); Karinne Coombes, Universal
Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International Relations?,
43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 420 (2011).
7
Engle, supra note 4.
8
ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida
Miller & D.M. Davis eds., 2016).
9
Samuel Moyn, Anti-Impunity as Deflection of Argument, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 68, 68.
10
An exception to this, discussed below, is Janie Chuang’s important critique
of criminalization in the context of trafficking. See Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation
Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 609 passim (2014).
11
See, e.g., Anthony Heath et al., Contested Terrain: Explaining Divergent
Patterns of Public Opinion Towards Immigration within Europe, 46 J. ETHNIC &
5
6
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seeks to determine to what extent the critique the literature raises is
applicable to the burgeoning anti-impunity discourse on migrants
and refugees. As I have been involved in several of the initiatives
described below, I do not argue from a purely academic perspective.
My perspective is one of engaged academic and lawyer.
Part II briefly explains what anti-impunity is. Part III identifies
the emergence of what I call the new anti-impunity. I describe how
the discourse appeared in refugee and migration policy
conversations in three regional contexts: Australia, the external
borders of the EU, and the United States. Part IV summarizes a set
of critiques scholars have raised in recent years against the human
rights movement’s turn to anti-impunity. As advocates, should we
extend anti-impunity discourse toward migrant and refugee
struggles? Or should the critique—originally directed at perceived
shortcomings of anti-impunity in responding to war crimes and
authoritarianism—serve as a warning against anti-impunity’s
futility or adverse consequences? While highlighting the value of
the critique, I offer a qualified defense for strategies grounded in
anti-impunity. Part V concludes by providing an assessment of the
merits, as well as the potential pitfalls, of the turn to criminal law in
struggles for refugee and migrant rights.
II.

WHAT IS ANTI-IMPUNITY?

The Rome Statute came into force in 2002 and established the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 12 The Statute’s preamble
declares the aspirations that motivated its drafting process: “that
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole must not go unpunished . . . .” 13 The drafters were
“[d]etermine[d] to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of
these crimes . . . .“14 In Samuel Moyn’s words, perceptive if mildly
overstated, the ICC has come to symbolize “the new dream of
individual criminal accountability as a central feature—perhaps the
central feature—of our current vision of international or global
MIGRATION STUD. 475, 475 (2019) (observing that “public opposition to immigration
has become a major disruptive force in developed democracies, with the emergence
of a new family of political parties, the populist radical right”).
12
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
13 Id. at pmbl.
14 Id.
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justice.”15 This Article argues against the view that criminal law is
occluding other vocabularies of global justice, and instead argues
that in the migration context, anti-impunity is part of a wider
progressive vision.
Commentators locate the sources of anti-impunity as a genre of
legal rhetoric long before the Rome Statute. The popular historical
narrative often begins with the Nuremberg trials, continues with the
establishment of ad-hoc tribunals,16 and culminates with the Rome
Statute.17 Other iconic instances in which anti-impunity discourse
has been central are Argentina’s “dirty war” trials; the debate
surrounding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission;
and the discussion on how to measure justice against peace in war
crimes cases in which Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups
have been charged.18 Anti-impunity has been central to debates on
transitional justice, a field pioneered against the backdrop of postauthoritarian accountability efforts. 19
Recall anti-impunity’s
Argentinian cri de cœur: “Nunca Más!”20 Anti-impunity’s focus on
Moyn, supra note 9, at 69.
See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
(establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”)); U.N. SCOR, 3453 mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
(establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)).
17
Vasuki Nesiah, Doing History with Impunity, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 95, 110 (providing a critique of historical
progress among atrocity trials).
18
For literature focusing specifically on historical examples of anti-impunity
in international criminal law and atrocity trials see, Karen Engle, A Genealogy of the
Criminal Turn in Human Rights, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA,
supra note 8, at 15, 39; Zinaida Miller, Anti-Impunity Politics in Post-Genocide
Rwanda, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 149,
149; Louise Mallinder, The End of Amnesty or Regional Overreach: Interpreting the
Erosion of South America’s Amnesty Laws, 65 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 645 (2016); Engle,
supra note 4 at 1101 n.131; Natalie Sedacca, The ‘Turn’ to Criminal Justice in Human
Rights Law: An Analysis in the Context of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement, 19 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 315 (2019); Rodolfo Mattarollo, Impunity and International Law, 11 REVUE
QUÉBÉCIOSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 81, 94 (1998).
19
See David Dyzenhaus, Transitional Justice, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 163, 164 (2003)
(book review) (discussing the history of the concept of transitional justice); Paige
Arthur, How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of
Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 321, 323-24 (2009) (“This essay examines the
shift . . . from the recognition of new practical dilemmas to the development of a
knowledge-base to address those dilemmas through the emergence of a new field
called ‘transitional justice.’”).
20
See Jamal Benomar, Confronting the Past: Justice After Transitions, 4 J.
DEMOCRACY 3, 11 (1993) (referencing a government-commissioned report that
revealed the atrocities committed by Argentina’s military regime in the 1970s and
1980s).
15
16
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criminal law and on punishment has been dominant in campaigns
against human rights violations in war and under authoritarian
government throughout the twenty-first century.21
Lawyers have often expressed the view that the “impunity gap”
should constantly be “narrow[ed],” culminating in impunity’s
ultimate “eradicat[ion].”22 It is this kind of rhetoric that will later
become the backdrop for a critique that criminal justice has
expanded disproportionately, somehow “colonizing” the global
moral-political imagination.23 Indeed, the turn to criminal law in the
human rights agenda has expanded far beyond the instances noted
above. For example, the rhetoric of anti-impunity has become
central for certain feminists and is perhaps most familiarly
associated with the work of Catherine MacKinnon. 24 As Janie
Chuang has documented, a watershed moment in the human rights
agenda’s turn to criminal law was the framing of the Trafficking
Protocol of 2000. 25 Citing previous work by Anne Gallagher,
Chuang explains how “the Trafficking Protocol, developed as a
protocol to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime . . . ‘unceremoniously plucked’ the trafficking mandate out of
the human rights realm and reframed it as a criminal justice issue.”26
In 2008, MacKinnon was appointed Special Gender Adviser to
the Prosecutor of the ICC, with the expectation that she helps the
court speak for the victims of sexual violence.27 In an address soon
after her appointment, MacKinnon explained: “The campaign of
violence against women well-documented around the world, with
substantial variation but also substantial impunity, is the longest-

ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 1.
See, e.g., Helen Duffy, Toward Eradicating Impunity: The Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 26 SOC. JUST. 115, 116 (1999) (“To suggest that the
creation of an ICC will single-handedly eradicate impunity would be fanciful, but
as an essential part of the emerging system of international justice, it will make a
real contribution to narrowing the impunity gap.”).
23 See discussion infra Part IV.
24
Janie Chuang calls this group the “neo-abolitionists”, emphasizing the
analogy they drew between trafficking and slavery. See Chuang, supra note 10, at
615-16.
25 Id. at 614-16.
26
Id. (citing ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
TRAFFICKING 62 n. 48 (2012)).
27
Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect, Int’l Crim. Ct., “Gender Justice and the
ICC: Progress and Reflections”: International Conference: 10 Years Review of the
ICC. Justice for All? The International Criminal Court 3 (Feb. 14, 2012).
21
22
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running siege of crimes against humanity in the real sense.” 28
Comparable to the yet-to-evolve rhetoric in the migration context,
examined below, MacKinnon charged that societies and their
leaders have been complicit in a worldwide criminal scheme.29
The new frontiers of anti-impunity go further, arguably
including the global fight against climate change. 30 For example,
Philip Alston has recently warned of a “climate apartheid.”31 The
categorization of something as an “apartheid” aims to trigger
fundamental rejection. It is one of those words that should
presumably make us say “never again.” At a Democratic
presidential debate in November 2019, Senator Bernie Sanders
reiterated his proposal to criminally prosecute fossil fuel executives
“who knowingly destroyed the planet.”32 Senator Sanders appealed
to the sentiment human rights scholars have termed anti-impunity.
Such views may suggest that anti-impunity is exclusively
associated with liberal and progressive political agendas. The truth
is, however, that the legal and rhetorical strategy of anti-impunity
can serve different masters. Conservative agendas are just as likely
as progressive ones.33 A newfound anti-impunity agenda among
conservatives seeking to criminalize abortions, for example,

28
Catharine Mackinnon, Special Gender Adviser to the Prosecutor of the Int’l
Crim. Ct., The Int’l Crim. Ct. and Gender Crimes, Address at Consultative
Conference on International Criminal Justice (Sept. 11, 2009).
29
Id. Other feminists have stressed the limits of international criminal law in
achieving substantive changes. See Doris Buss, Performing Legal Order: Some
Feminist Thoughts on International Criminal Law, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 409, 409 (2011)
(arguing that criminal law is an inherently limited arena for advocating for
“feminist-inspired social change”); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Dina Francesca Haynes &
Naomi Cahn, Criminal Justice for Gendered Violence and Beyond, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
425, 426 (2011) (arguing that international criminal law alone cannot adequately
address the underlying systemic causes of gender-based violence).
30
See Itamar Mann, Eichmann’s Mistake: The Problem of Thoughtlessness in
International Criminal Law, 33 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 145 passim (2020) (noting that
knowingly taking actions that are detrimental to the environment could, in some
points of view, be construed as international actions).
31
Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Hum. Rts.),
Climate Change and Poverty, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc./HRC/41/39 (June 25, 2019).
32
Bernie Sanders (@BernieSanders), TWITTER (Nov. 20, 2019, 10:11 PM),
https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1197351780604141569?ref_src=twsrc%
5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1197351780604141569&ref_url
=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vox.com%2F2019%2F11%2F12%2F20959293%2Fberniesanders-climate-lawsuit-exxon-juliana-sinnok [https://perma.cc/RWY2-ZU5Z].
33
Political agendas that are possibly not consonant with an agenda of antiimpunity are those that oppose criminal law as such (this may be true about certain
libertarian or anarchistic tendencies). See Mann, supra note 30, at 159.
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illustrates that it is not necessarily liberal. 34 A particularly
remarkable case-in-point is Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas’s comparison between birth control and eugenics, and its
historical motivation “to exterminate” the black population.35 Just
like with the concentration camps example, which I will discuss
below in some detail, the anti-impunity vocabulary’s tendency to
return to loaded historical examples is clear. Other conservatives
have called for prosecuting those responsible for abortion clinics.36
Whether their aspirations—or Sanders’—are closer to political
realities, remains to be seen.
Alongside climate change, the struggle against impunity for
violations against refugees and migrants is another new frontier
associated with liberal and progressive views. Be their political
orientation as they may, the novel developments continue previous
campaigns against impunity in the contexts of war and
authoritarianism and build upon them. Considering the old leftist
critique according to which criminal law enforces an unequal
distribution of private property,37 anti-impunity’s endurance within
the progressive camp should not be taken for granted. Around the
world, criminal law has often been used to disproportionally
incarcerate racially discriminated against or politically disfavored
groups.38 Curiously, these new articulations of anti-impunity have
developed precisely when optimism about the ICC as a forum for
accountability has generally waned. 39 Rather than protecting
34
For Justice Thomas’s recent opinion on that matter, which engages antiimpunity rhetoric, see Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780
(2019) (discussing the history of birth control as it relates to eugenics and forced
sterilization). See also Helena Alviar García & Karen Engle, The Distributive Politics
of Impunity and Anti-Impunity: Lessons from Four Decades of Colombian Peace
Negotiations, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at
216, 226 (noting that in Colombia, “[a]nti-impunity became the cry of both the left
and the right, albeit not always at the same time”).
35 Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1788 (citing Birth Control or Race Control? Sanger and the
Negro Project, Margaret Sanger Papers Project Newsletter #28 (2001),
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sanger/articles/bc_or_race_control.php
[https://perma.cc/L6KS-72ER]).
36
See Mann, supra note 30, at 166-70.
37
For a more nuanced account, see Paul Q. Hirst, Marx and Engels on Law,
Crime and Morality, 1 ECON. & SOC’Y 28 passim (1972) (articulating and emphasizing
the transformations in Marx’s theory of law, and thus highlighting its complexities).
38
See Engle, supra note 4, at 1125-26.
39
For information on how the expectations of the ICC are now generally more
modest than they were at its founding see, ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
AGENDA, supra note 8, at 4; Engle, supra note 4, at 1116-17, 1125-26; Moyn, supra note

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/3

2021]

Border Violence as Crime

685

refugees and migrants, criminal law is applied ever more frequently
to block access to asylum.40 What is the lasting appeal of criminal
law among liberal and progressive advocates working in the field of
migration?
At the center of the international human rights system lie
multilateral conventions, sometimes equipped with monitoring
systems or quasi-constitutional tribunals, designed to discipline
states.41 The anti-impunity discourse, however, goes beyond this
focus on states. In the international law sphere, anti-impunity
reflects a proclivity towards sources of law that seem not to require
explicit state consent, i.e., those of jus cogens. It adopts the language
of absolute prohibition binding upon all (“erga omnes”). 42 Antiimpunity’s emphasis on criminal accountability, particularly but not
only in the guise of international criminal justice, relates to its reliance
on such absolute imperatives.43
Both the vocabulary of jus cogens and that of criminal law are
exceptional in the international human rights law environment, in
which states are still the dominant actors. The two emphasize the
9, at 71; David Luban, After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of
International Criminal Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 505 passim (2013).
40 See, e.g., Cathryn Costello & Michelle Foster, Non-refoulement as Custom
and Jus Cogens? Putting the Prohibition to the Test, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 273, 275
(2016); SARAH HAMMERL, UNITED AGAINST INHUMANITY, ASYLUM CRIMINALISATION IN
EUROPE AND ITS HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS 2 (2019); UN Special Rapporteur
Attacks “International Regime of Impunity” Over Migrant Deaths, U.N. HUM. RTS.
OFF. HIGH COMM’R (Oct. 27, 2017) (referencing a UN-commissioned report on the
EU’s
criminalization
of
asylum
seekers),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2
2322&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/WP6D-2VS2]. For additional information, see
the below discussion on “crimmigration,” infra note 123 (citing the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions’ report critiquing
the international community for failing to protect migrants and refugees).
41
See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1966); Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened
for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
42
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 passim (1996) (arguing that when an
international crime achieves jus cogens status, states should be obligated to proceed
against perpetrators of such crimes).
43
See Akhavan, supra note 2, at 9 (explaining how the ICTY and ICTR helped
introduce a structure for criminal accountability in the international criminal justice
system).
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responsibility of individuals rather than stopping at the
responsibilities of states.44 Some argue that corporations should be
held criminally liable for their actions, too; once again going beyond
international law’s traditional focus.45 In a world in which violators
include for-profit corporations, part of the appeal of criminal law
emanates from an expectation that it can fill an accountability
deficit.46 The new anti-impunity that has emerged in the context of
migration has been drawn, considerably, by this effort to extend
international accountability from states to individuals and
corporations.
In my scholarship, I have identified a structural accountability
deficit when it comes to irregular migrants, which I have argued is
hard-wired in international law. 47 Among scholars and activists
seeking to defend migrants from border violence, extending
accountability to individuals and corporations has sometimes
seemed like a compelling way to potentially fill that deficit. But
what do the concrete examples of “the new anti-impunity” look
like?
Before discussing the strategic and philosophical
underpinnings of this orientation to law, I first need to demonstrate
that the phenomenon exists.
III. THE NEW ANTI-IMPUNITY
a. Foundational Obligations Towards Migrants
For a couple of decades, commentators have argued that the
duty of non-refoulement—barring the return of refugees to where
they may suffer persecution—has attained the status of jus cogens: it

44
See id. at 27 (discussing the ICC’s role in ensuring that member states
“impose individual accountability for international crimes.”); Thomas Weatherall,
Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in Contemporary
Jurisprudence, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1151, 1154-55 (2015) (“Individual responsibility is at
the core of the legal regime of jus cogens . . . .”).
45 See Mordechai Kremnitzer, A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal Liability on
Corporations in International Criminal Law, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 909, 909 (2010).
46
On migration and accountability generally, see Cathryn Costello & Itamar
Mann, Border Justice: Migration and Accountability for Human Rights Violations,
GERMAN L.J. 311 (2020).
47
Itamar Mann, Maritime Legal Black Holes: Migration and Rightlessness in
International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 347, 357, 368 (2018).
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has become a peremptory norm of international law, binding upon
all regardless of state consent.48
Though the claim has often been questioned, its very prevalence
is indicative. For some groups, non-refoulement has been part of a
moral vocabulary experienced as a kind of “higher law.” 49
Consider, for example, the “sanctuary” tradition practiced in
churches and other religious organizations to protect refugees in
danger of deportation. “When Churches and their congregations
confer ‘sanctuary,’” wrote Richard Falk in 1988, “they are
interposing their bodies and lives between the government and
these beleaguered individuals from overseas.” 50 These acts of
solidarity are of course not criminal law measures. They do not
reflect, in and of themselves, an impetus towards punishment.
Indeed, rather than a strong crime-and-punishment discourse, they
belong to a vocabulary of civil disobedience.51 They therefore may
seem odd as a starting point for a discussion of anti-impunity in the
migration and refugee contexts.
Yet, the perception that non-refoulement has become jus cogens
has been an important pre-condition for the new anti-impunity.
First, jus cogens obligations are thought of as binding upon
individuals. Such obligations thus help transform questions of
fundamental rights and state duties into questions of individual
responsibility. Second, they have often rested on an analogy to
historic heroic acts in the face of atrocity, such as hiding members of
persecuted groups from Nazi persecutors. 52 They, therefore,
encourage an analogy between historic atrocities and present
policies. Third, they reflect an aspiration to break free from the
See, e.g., Costello & Foster, supra note 40, at 307-08.
For an account of the place of moral imperatives towards migrants and
refugees in international law, see ITAMAR MANN, HUMANITY AT SEA: MARITIME
MIGRATION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016). See also MORITZ
BAUMGÄRTEL, DEMANDING RIGHTS: EUROPE’S SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE
DILEMMA OF MIGRANT VULNERABILITY 137-52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019).
50
Richard Falk, Accountability, Asylum, and Sanctuary: Challenging Our Political
and Legal Imagination, 16 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 199, 201 (1988). See also MANN,
supra note 49, at 211 (commenting on Falk’s observations); Jon Sharman, Pilots Stop
222 Asylum Seekers Being Deported from Germany by Refusing to Fly, INDEP. (Dec. 5,
2017),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-pilotsrefuse-deport-asylum-seekers-lufthansa-angela-merkel-migrants-a8092276.html
[https://perma.cc/H57H-KH98] (providing another example of such instances of
civil disobedience).
51
See Itamar Mann, The Right to Perform Rescue at Sea: Jurisprudence and
Drowning, 21 GERMAN L.J. 598, 614-18 (2020).
52 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 208, 255.
48
49
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strictures of extant political conditions and transcend them
altogether: rather than a vision of political transformation through
majoritarian institutions, the paradigm is one of direct action. 53
These three aspects of the sanctuary tradition prepared the ground
for a turn to impunity in the context of refugee and migrant rights
and have remained its central tenets. To the extent that we can talk
of migration anti-impunity as a movement, the three remain its
distinct characteristics.
Starting from the first decade of the twenty-first century, human
rights organizations began to report on human rights violations
against asylum seekers in detention. Little by little, we started to see
invocations of stricter legal standards, particularly the prohibition
of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. 54 Contrary to
previous human rights reporting on refugees, which directed
allegations of torture nearly exclusively against past events in states
producing refugees, now the “host” states were sometimes alleged
culprits. 55 The new allegations of torture are often also directed
against border enforcement agencies and corporations
implementing border policies for developed countries.56
53
See generally Costello & Foster, supra note 40, at 276 n. 42 (discussing the
“custom plus” approach to identify norms of customary international law that have
achieved jus cogens status); Georg Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43
TEX. L. REV. 455, 456 (1965) (explaining the features of jus cogens); Weatherall, supra
note 44, at 1154-55 (comparing jus cogens and the tradition of international law in
conjunction with Nuremberg prosecutions); Jens David Ohlin, In Praise of Jus
Cogens’ Conceptual Incoherence, 63 MCGILL L.J. 701, 711, 718 (2018) (demonstrating
how jus cogens is a compromise and justifying it based on a theory of fiduciary
duties).
54 See, e.g., Claire Henderson, Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers: From
Human Rights Violations to Crimes Against Humanity, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1161, 1175
(2014) (noting that Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers is likely not in
compliance with multiple multilateral conventions).
55
See Priscilla Alvarez, Exclusive: Watchdog Finds Detainees ‘Standing on Toilets’
for Breathing Room at Border Facility Holding 900 People in Space Meant for 125, CNN
(May 31, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/31/politics/inspector-generalwarns-overcrowded-conditions/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9WLG-W5T4]
(describing “’dangerous overcrowding’ and unsanitary conditions at an El Paso,
Texas, Border Patrol processing facility”); The Ed. Bd., Children Shouldn’t Be Dying
at the Border.
Here’s How You Can Help, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/opinion/border-kids-immigration-help.
html [https://perma.cc/WAX2-S7MF] (exposing the treatment of child asylum
seekers at the border by US immigration officials).
56 See, e.g., Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Squalid Conditions at Border Detention Centers,
Government
Report
Finds,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
2,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/politics/border-center-migrant-dete
ntion.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/L25M-QC8S] (describing
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Under customary international law as well as under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), “[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture.”57 International law imposes
such prohibitions on states, but criminal law too proscribes them,
both in the domestic and in the international spheres. 58 As for
international criminal law, the Rome Statute tells us the
foundational status granted to torture includes other related
behaviors, in a list of categories that is not positively finite. While
systematized torture is defined as a crime against humanity in
Article 7(1)(e), Article 7(1)(e) similarly criminalizes imprisonment
“in violation of fundamental rules of international law;” and Article
7(1)(k) refers to “other inhumane acts.” 59 The three provisions
illustrate the “open texture” of international criminal law.60 Such a
texture suggests that forms of violence not previously considered
international crimes can be added.61
Through the doctrinal avenue of “crimes against humanity” and
the notion that some legal rules cannot be compromised, advocates
have made the transition from state responsibility to individual
criminal liability. This is the basic component of anti-impunity
rhetoric. In the following subsections, I trace how the transition has
been made in three different regional contexts: Australia, the EU,
and the U.S.
the findings of an official watchdog report revealing “overcrowded, squalid
conditions” in U.S. migrant centers); Chantal Da Silva, U.S. Border Patrol Accused of
Forcing Migrant Families Sleeping Outside to Wake Up and Stand Every Three Hours,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/us-border-patrolaccused-forcing-migrant-families-sleeping-outside-wake-stand-1382858
[https://perma.cc/RFM4-T7WS] (discussing accusations that border patrol agents
committed inhumane abuses against asylum seekers in holding areas); Tendayi E.
Achiume et al., The Situation in Nauru and Manus Island: Liability for Crimes against
Humanity
in
the
Detention
of
Refugees
and
Asylum
Seekers,
https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Communiqu
%C3%A9-to-Office-Prosecutor-IntlCrimCt-Art15RomeStat-14Feb2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4YT-WBHM].
57
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 41, art. 2(2).
58
Indeed, the criminalisation of torture is obligatory under the Convention
Against Torture. See id., art. 4.
59
Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(e)-(f), (k).
60
On the “open texture of law,” see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124128 (3d ed. 2012).
61
This of course raises a concern in terms of the principle of legality, nullum
crimen sine lege.
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Australia

In 2001, Australia introduced the “Pacific Solution,” whereby
refugees seeking asylum were sent for “processing” in Australianfunded detention centers in Nauru and Manus Island, Papua New
Guinea.62 Modeled on the United States’ earlier offshore treatment
of asylum seekers in Guantanamo Bay, Australian offshore
detention stretched rule of law principles.63
Scholar and activist responses to the Pacific Solution arguably
pioneered the new anti-impunity. Influenced by reports on human
rights violations in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, Penny Green
and Mike Grewcock argued in 2002 that “the failure by states to
positively embrace the right to asylum . . . have resulted in the
systematic and organised breach of human rights, . . . which can
usefully be defined as state crime.”64 While the Australian model
was the most draconian, the authors also pointed their fingers
towards Europe: “the new Europe is not just a fortress, but a bastion
of state crime.” 65 The “state crime” paradigm, anchored in
criminology (rather than law), rests on an analogy between state
policies and crimes.66 It is thus not per se a criminal allegation—the
latter can be directed towards an individual or a corporation, but not

62
See Ishan Ashutosh & Alison Mountz, Migration Management for the Benefit
of Whom? Interrogating the Work of the International Organization for Migration, 15
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 21, 31 (2011) (noting the role of the International Organization of
Migration (“IOM”) in putting in place this infrastructure); Itamar Mann, Dialectic of
Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human Rights 1993-2013, 54 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 315, 334 (2013).
63
See DANIEL GHEZELBASH, REFUGE LOST: ASYLUM IN AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD 130-133 (2018); see also Tania Penovic & Azadeh Dastyari, Boatloads of
Incongruity: The Evolution of Australia’s Offshore Processing Regime 13 AUSTL. J. HUM.
RTS. 33, 34 (2007); Mann, supra note 62.
64
Penny Green & Mike Grewcock, The War Against Illegal Immigration: State
Crime and the Construction of a European Identity, 14 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 87, 88
(2002).
65
Id. at 88, 98. Coming from the perspective of criminology, the authors
explain that state crime refers to instances when the state engages in violence that
would be criminal “if performed by ‘individual citizens.’” Id. at 98. They therefore
rely on a kind of hypothetical and do not necessary imply that suspects should be
investigated and perhaps prosecuted under extant law. Id.
66
For background on the “state crime” paradigm in criminology, see Herman
Schwendinger & Julia Schwendinger, Defenders of Order or Guardians of Human
Rights? 5 ISSUES CRIMINOLOGY 123, 141 (1970); Stanley Cohen, Human Rights and
Crimes of the State: The Culture of Denial, 26 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 97, 97-103
(1993).
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towards a state.67 Certainly, it sets in motion a way of thinking in
which migrants and refugees are the victims of guilty acts (actus rei),
perpetrated by actors who entertain criminal intent (mens rea).68
Such concerns were partially assuaged when, in 2008, Australia
temporarily ceased its offshore detention. 69
But following
Australia’s return to the scheme in 2012, 70 Member of Parliament
Andrew Wilkie took an additional step, demanding that the ICC
investigate Tony Abbott’s government for crimes against asylum
seekers.71 Wilkie prepared a communication under Article 15 of the
Rome Statute, calling upon the prosecutor to initiate an investigation
based on the information he provided (proprio motu). 72 As he
explained, “’[i]n my application I have particularly named crimes
against humanity, such as the forced relocation of people, obviously
to the Republic of Nauru or Papua New Guinea.’” 73 On the
academic side, Claire Henderson quickly followed and argued in
2014 that Australian policies constituted a prima facie international
criminal case against Australian agents. 74 The publication of her
paper in the Journal of International Criminal Justice, a wellregarded and high-profile peer-reviewed publication dedicated to
international criminal law, was a signal. The argument about

See Green & Grewcock, supra note 64, at 98.
See generally Mann, supra note 30 (discussing how potential defendants may
be unknowingly committing acts that are illegal).
69
Immigration Detention in Australia, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL. (Mar. 20, 2013),
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parli
amentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012-2013/Detention
[https://perma.cc/Y77FGDEC].
70
Id.
71
See Amy Maguire, Will the International Criminal Court Prosecute Australia for
Crimes Against Humanity?, CONVERSATION (Oct. 26, 2014, 11:29 PM),
https://theconversation.com/will-the-international-criminal-court-prosecuteaustralia-for-crimes-against-humanity-33363 [https://perma.cc/3G7P-NRQ7].
72 Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 15.
73
Shalailah Medhora, Asylum Seekers: Andrew Wilkie Takes Australia to
International
Criminal
Court,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
21,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/oct/22/asylum-seekers-an
drew-wilkie-takes-australia-to-international-criminal-court
[https://perma.cc/9XTY-GPSN]. Wilkie submitted his full communiqué on
January 23, 2015. See COMMUNIQUÉ FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR REGARDING
MR. ANDREW WILKIE MP’S APPLICATION RELATING TO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
AUSTRALIA, Ref: OTP-CR-322/14 (Jan. 23, 2015), https://andrewwilkie.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/Brief-for-the-ICC-OTP-CR-322-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36LW-QK3K].
74
Henderson, supra note 54, at 1173-74.
67
68
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international crimes against refugees committed by Australian
agents was no longer perceived as “off the wall.”75
Henderson emphasized the crimes of persecution and
imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules of international
law.76 Unlike Wilkie, she expressed the view that deportation may
not be the “relevant prohibited act”. 77
These doctrinal
disagreements, which will continue among advocates of a criminal
law framing for border violence, reflect that the relevant
interpretations were far from settled. As will be the case in the
European and U.S. contexts, they highlight an emerging agreement
that certain acts of violence committed by state agents against
asylum seekers are indeed criminal. The question would now be,
how do we best express that within the boxes of the relevant legal
text?
In 2016, Vincent Chetail published another remarkable piece,
taking Australia as one case study, and laying the groundwork for a
more general turn to anti-impunity.78 Chetail’s opening paragraph
conveys the sentiment that impunity for violations against migrants
had indeed approached something like a worldwide criminal
scheme.79 Referencing MP Wilkie’s submission, Chetail asks:
Is there any blood on my hands? This is a question shared
by an increasing number of people who observe or carry out
migration control in the Global North and the rest of the
world.
This questioning has become a particularly
controversial issue in Australia where the policy of returning
asylum-seekers and the accompanying mistreatment are
alleged to amount to crimes against humanity.80
While the phrase “alleged,” taken out of context, may connote
passive reporting on a preexisting interpretation of the law, Chetail
advances his own interpretation to the effect mentioned. A
longstanding tradition among lawyers, the idea is to set in motion a
75
On the importance of “off the wall” arguments in legal interpretation, see
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982).
76 Henderson, supra note 54, at 1178-80.
77 Id. at 1176-78.
78
Vincent Chetail, Is There any Blood on my Hands? Deportation as a Crime of
International Law, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 917, 917-19 (2016).
79
Id. at 917.
80 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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novel legal interpretation while conveying that it is only another
step in a well-trodden path.81
Chetail doubles down on deportation as the relevant
international criminal prohibition for the protection of asylum
seekers and migrants. 82 Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute,
deportation may constitute a crime against humanity when
conducted as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” 83
Citing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia’s Tadić, Chetail points out that an armed conflict is not a
necessary condition for deportation to constitute an attack against a
civilian population.84 Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity
can be perpetrated in times of peace.85 Chetail even goes so far as to
demonstrate that deportations may constitute a crime of genocide.86
In his conclusion, he discusses Australian interceptions of boat
migrants and the policy of delivering them to offshore detention
sites, dispassionately observing: “there are some reasonable
grounds to argue that the systematic nature of these unlawful
deportations associated with the state policy of arbitrary detention
may reach the threshold required to be considered a crime against
humanity under conditions detailed in the present article.”87
On February 22, 2017, a group of seventeen lawyers, Chetail
among them, filed another Communication under Article 15 of the
Rome Statute against Australian agents. 88
This time, the
communication came from outside of Australia and was facilitated
by Stanford Law School’s International Human Rights and Conflict
81
On the relevance of this method to international law, see Başak Çali, On
Interpretivism and International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 805 (2009). For effective
examples of this move when aiming to protect the rights of asylum seekers and
migrants see the works of Violeta Moreno-Lax, such as Violeta Moreno-Lax, Seeking
Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’
Obligations Accruing at Sea, 23 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 174 passim (2011).
82
Chetail, supra note 78, at 919-40.
83 Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7.
84 Chetail, supra note 78, at 923.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 933-40.
87 Id. at 943.
88
Achiume, supra note 56. The full list of signatories includes: Tendayi E.
Achiume, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, James Cavallaro, Vincent Chetail, Robert Cryer,
Gearóid Ó Cuinn, Tom J. Dannenbaum, Kevin Jon Heller, Ioannis Kalpouzos,
Itamar Mann, Sara Kendall, Makau Mutua, Gregor Noll, Anne Orford, Diala
Shamas, Gerry Simpson, and Beth Van Schaack. Id.
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Resolution Clinic and the Global Legal Action Network (“GLAN”).89
Together with Ioannis Kalpouzos and Diala Shamas, I was also one
of the principal authors of the complaint. We alleged several subtitles of crimes against humanity, including imprisonment (Article
7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute), torture (Article 7(1)(f)), persecution
(Article 7(1)(h)), deportation (Article 7(1)(d)), and other inhumane
acts (Article 7(1)(k)). 90 We particularly highlighted questions of
corporate liability pertaining to companies that administered
Australia’s facilities.91
In July 2017, U Ne Oo, an activist from Sydney, made an
additional Article 15 submission. 92 This third communication
focuses on a rather unorthodox interpretation of the crime of
enslavement (Article 7 1. c.) under the Rome Statute. Allegedly, the
Australian government has “lent” asylum seekers to private
corporations, so that they generate a profit from their business of
running Australian “processing centers” on Nauru and Manus. 93
While it is unclear if the interpretation of enslavement is sound, the
categorization illuminates a crucial aspect of the Australian situation
which other communications highlight as well: Australia has not
only “externalized” its enforcement to Nauru and Manus as states;94
it also outsourced its violations to corporations and privatized
them.95 The new anti-impunity discourse, like earlier instances of

Id. at 9.
Id. at 5.
91 Id. at 101-06.
92
U Ne Oo, Enslavement in Manus Island and Nauru, Summary of Allegations,
http://www.netipr.org/saorg/docs/enclosure_icc-reply-n-comm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J47W-2C3Z]. See also Dr. U Ne Oo, Letter to Australia Foreign
Minister,
ROHINGYA
BLOGGER
(Jan
27,
2013),
http://www.rohingyablogger.com/2013/01/letter-to-australia-foreign-ministerby.html?zx=373835d249704281 [https://perma.cc/9HNG-7A78].
93 Id. ¶¶ 19-21.
94
On “externalization” of border control, see Ashutosh & Mountz, supra note
62, at 28, 31-32; Sherally Munshi, Immigration, Imperialism, and the Legacies of Indian
Exclusion, 28 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 51, 99 (2016); Bill Frelick, Ian M. Kysel & Jennifer
Podkul, The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum
Seekers and Other Migrants, 4 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 190, 193-99 (2016). See
also B. Shaw Drake & Elizabeth Gibson, Vanishing Protection: Access to Asylum at the
Border, 21 CUNY L. REV. 91, 115-17 (2017); Rachael E. De Orio, Seeking Sanctuary
Across the Sea: Why the Influx of Refugees and Asylum Seekers to Greece Requires Major
Policy Changes, 41 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 51, 70, 97-98 (2018).
95
Achiume, supra note 56, at 101-06. Relevant enterprises include Spanish
Ferrovial, Transfield, Broadspectrum, and most recently Ferrovial.
89
90
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such discourse, aimed to activate basic liberal commitments against
historical atrocities—in this case, that of slavery.96
At the time of publication, the applications have been rejected.97
Perhaps the latest iteration in the development of anti-impunity on
the Australian front is a class action filed on December 10, 2018,
arguing the country subjected refugees to crimes against humanity
in the offshore sites. 98 Though the lawsuit seeks civil damages
rather than criminal punishment, the appeal to crimes against
humanity reveals ripple effects of the new anti-impunity discourse
beyond strictly punitive measures. As Gabrielle Holly has
emphasized, the synthesis between international criminal law and
tort law has yielded a measure of accountability, even if impunity
largely remains.99
ii.

The European Union

On the European front, the framing of abuses against refugees
and migrants as criminal offenses first emerged around the same
time as it did in Australia. Namely, after the Rome Statute came into
force in 2002. The European migration anti-impunity discourse
arguably started with efforts to criminalize human trafficking,
rather than direct allegations against border enforcement policies.100

96 Compare the reference to slavery and trade in humans in the Libyan context,
infra note 126, with the use of the concentration camps analogy in the United States
context, infra notes 208, 212, 213, and Mann, supra note 30, at 18.
97 Letter from Phakiso Mochochoko, Dir., Jurisdiction, Complementarity &
Coop. Div., Int’l Crim. Ct., to Kate Allingham, Off. of Andrew Wilkie MP (Feb. 12,
2020).
98 See Helen Davidson, Australia Subjected Refugees to Crimes against Humanity,
Class
Actions
Allege,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
9,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/dec/10/australia-subjected
-refugees-to-crimes-against-humanity-class-actions-allege
[https://perma.cc/522Y-CSFG].
99
Gabrielle Holly, Challenges to Australia’s Offshore Detention Regime and the
Limits of Strategic Tort Litigation, 21 GERMAN L.J. 549, 550-51 (2020).
100
See Engle, supra note 4, at 1073-79; Anne Gallagher & Paul Holmes,
Developing an Effective Criminal Justice Response to Human Trafficking: Lessons from the
Front Line, 18 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 318, 319-21 (2008); see also HAMMERL, supra note
40, at 14 (discussing criminalization of humanitarian action relating to assistance
for refugees in Europe).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

696

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:3

During the drafting of the Rome Statute, the drafters
contemplated if human trafficking would be criminalized.101 Article
7(2)(c) specifies that the definition of “enslavement” includes
ownership over persons exercised in the context of trafficking. 102
Starting from the beginning of the twenty-first century, an antiimpunity discourse therefore aimed to protect migrants and
refugees from traffickers, sometimes by reference to international
criminal law.103 This push went hand in hand with a larger feminist
campaign, as trafficked individuals are often female victims of
sexual violence.104 Notably, this feminist push towards criminal law
generated controversy within the feminist movement. While it was
vociferously advanced by MacKinnon and others,105 Janie Chuang
and others objected on feminist grounds.106
Importantly, border enforcement policies also quickly adopted
the fight against traffickers and smugglers, latching on to its antiimpunity bent. As trafficking and smuggling represented constant
trespass across national borders, eliminating the perpetrators
gradually became a central priority of European border
governance. 107 This ad-hoc alignment between certain feminists,
refugee advocates, and states seeking to close their borders
101 See Tom Obokata, Trafficking of Human Beings as a Crime against Humanity:
Some Implications for the International Legal System, 54 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 445, 44853 (2005) (analyzing human trafficking as a crime against humanity under the Rome
Statute).
102
Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(2)(c).
103
See, e.g., Gallagher & Holmes, supra note 100, at 319; Anne Gallagher,
Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A
Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 983-84 (2001) (providing an example of
the discourse that emerged aimed at protecting migrants and refugees from
traffickers).
104
Engle, supra note 4, at 1078; see also Gallagher, supra note 103, at 983-88
(detailing contested debates over prostitution’s possible inclusion in the Rome
Statute’s definition of trafficking). But see Chuang, supra note 10, at 615 (criticizing
the divisive and hotly debated focus on the sex-sector in the legal definition of
trafficking as problematic).
105
See MacKinnon, supra note 28; see also Robin L. West, Legitimating the
Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1442-59 (1993)
(providing a critique on Beyond Rape). For a critique of MacKinnon’s interventions
in this context, see Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the
Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 1 passim (2008).
106 See Chuang, supra note 10, at 614-15.
107 See Gallagher, supra note 103, at 976-77, 998; Francois Crépeau, The Fight
Against Migrant Smuggling: Migration Containment Over Refugee Protection, in THE
REFUGEE CONVENTION AT FIFTY: A VIEW FROM FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 173 (Joanne
van Selm et al. eds., 2003).
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illustrates the political ambiguousness of the anti-impunity
agenda. 108 Critics would later raise the question of whether this
political ambiguity should ultimately rule anti-impunity out of a
vocabulary for social change. 109 As I explain below, I think the
answer is no.110
In 2010, a Human Rights Watch report accused Ukraine of using
torture practices against asylum seekers.111 The report highlighted
the role states on the outer margins of Europe had in the evolving
ill-treatment.112 As observers noted, the freer the movement within
Europe became, the worse the violence became at the EU’s external
borders.113 Similarly, several international organizations, as well as
non-international organizations, accused Greece of exposing asylum
seekers to torture and inhumane and degrading treatment. 114
Greece is relatively accessible from Iraq and Syria, places where new
political crises continually developed following the United States’

108
See Abigail Schwartz, Sex Trafficking in Cambodia, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 371,
374 (2004).
109 See infra Part IV.
110 Id.
111 Ukraine: Migrants and Asylum Seekers Tortured, Mistreated, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Dec. 16, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/16/ukraine-migrants-andasylum-seekers-tortured-mistreated [https://perma.cc/F4YW-5QVQ].
112 Id.
113
HAMMERL, supra note 40, at 8; Kenan Malik, How We All Colluded in Fortress
Europe,
GUARDIAN
(June
10,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/10/sunday-essay-how
-we-colluded-in-fortress-europe-immigration [https://perma.cc/RKU5-PQME].
Compare with early critiques of European economic integration, recounted in
QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM
182-217 (2018). This is what is referred to, in popular commentary, as the dynamic
of “fortress Europe.”
114 See No End in Sight: The Mistreatment of Asylum Seekers in Greece, OMCT SOSTORTURE
NETWORK
(Aug.
21,
2019),
https://www.omct.org/en/resources/news-releases/no-end-in-sight-the-mistrea
tement-of-asylum-seekers-in-greece [https://perma.cc/GWV5-LSUD] (describing
the mistreatment of asylum seekers in Greece).
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invasion of Iraq. 115 Allegations of “pushbacks” 116 and torture in
Greece paved the way for the impunity turn: as emphasized above,
torture can be analyzed as a matter of state responsibility, but it is
also a criminal offense. Critical reports about Greece culminated in
a landmark judgment at the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) in MSS v. Belgium and Greece.117 The Court prevented
returns to Greece from other European countries, 118 because
conditions in Greece amounted to violations of Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture
and inhuman and degrading treatment.119
In its MSS judgment, the ECtHR opined that the inhuman and
degrading treatment of asylum seekers was rampant in Greek
detention centers. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, when
imprisonment “in violation of fundamental rules of international
law” is part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population,” it constitutes a crime against humanity.120
As noted above, such an attack does not require the backdrop of an
armed conflict.121 Taken together, the MSS finding and the rules of
international criminal law therefore suggest a crime against
humanity was committed against asylum seekers in Greece. Far
from a merely technical result produced out of mixing two
115
Stuck in a Revolving Door, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 26, 2008),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/11/26/stuck-revolving-door/iraqis-and-oth
er-asylum-seekers-and-migrants-greece/turkey [https://perma.cc/GD4A-W4W4]
(emphasizing the consequences “generalized violence” in Iraq following the 2003
intervention on asylum seekers arrivals and asylum seekers processing in Greece).
On the calamitous results of American intervention in Iraq, see generally Asli Bâli
& Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the American Imperial Imagination, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 257, 281 (2018). On the use of the term “pushbacks,” see Niamh Keady-Tabbal
& Itamar Mann, “Pushbacks as Euphemism,” EJIL:TALK! (April 14, 2021),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/pushbacks-as-euphemism/#:~:text=Late%20in%20Mar
ch%2C%20the%20UN,border%20between%20Greece%20and%20Turkey
[https://perma.cc/8X32-5PNB].
116
Pushbacks are deportations of asylum seekers contrary to the rule of nonrefoulment. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, opened for
signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
117
The word ‘impunity’ appears once in the MSS judgment, where it refers to
conditions in Afghanistan. See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶
197 (2011).
118
Id. at 98, ¶ 3-9 (Villiger, J., dissenting).
119
Id. ¶ 424 (3) (unanimous declaration of a Greek violation of Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights).
120
Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7.
121
Chetail, supra note 78, at 923 (stating that a systematic attack against
civilians “does not require a nexus with an armed conflict and can be thus
committed in time of peace”).
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international legal “regimes” (international human rights law and
international criminal law), the inference seemed to encapsulate a
notable development: policies that seem to be part of the banal,
everyday practice of border enforcement are in fact egregious crimes
which many developed states are complicit in.122
That, at least, was the core of a legal argument Ioannis
Kalpouzos and I made in 2015, where we emphasized the
imprisonment aspect of immigration detention (Article 7(1)(e)). 123
We did not frame allegations exclusively or even primarily against
Greek agents. During the period we examined, border guards from
many European countries were deployed in Greece, as part of an
operation facilitated by Frontex, the European Union’s border
enforcement agency. 124 The distribution of responsibility among
multiple states, we argued, is an institutional design intended to
diffuse accountability.125 Along with the “externalization” of border
enforcement, and the privatization of control, the legal architecture
that evolved at the fault lines between “developed” and
“developing” states arguably generated a mode of impunity.126
Violations in Greece largely persisted over the coming years,
with the country’s European lenders rushing contributions for
detention facilities, but largely failing to alleviate conditions in
them.127 At the same time, another significant European struggle
against impunity for the violation of migrant rights occurred as a
122 See Agnes Callamard (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Unlawful Death of Refugees and
Migrants,
U.N.
Doc.
A/72/335
(Aug.
15,
2017),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1725806.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MS7-NNWS] (detailing killing by state and non-state actors of
migrants during their flight as a human rights crisis).
123
Ioannis Kalpouzos & Itamar Mann, Banal Crimes against Humanity: The Case
of Asylum Seekers in Greece, 16 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (2015) (describing the
imprisonment of asylum seekers as inhumane).
124 Id. at 9.
125 Id. at 22-24; see also Melanie Fink, Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy
and Human Rights Concerns Regarding ‘Technical Relationships’, 28 MERKOURIOSUTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 20, 21 (2012) (emphasizing the shift of border control to
“third countries”).
126
Mann, supra note 62, at 346-47.
127
Leonidas K. Cheliotis, Behind the Veil of Philoxenia: The Politics of Immigration
Detention in Greece, 10 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 725, 737 (2013); EUROPEAN UNION
AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (FRA), COPING WITH A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
EMERGENCY: THE SITUATION OF PERSONS CROSSING THE GREEK LAND BORDER IN AN
IRREGULAR
MANNER
6
(2011),
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1500-Greek-bordersituation-report2011_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/39XQ-UASY].
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response to policies conducted in the Central Mediterranean. Before
the Libyan 2011 revolution, Italy had already established
externalized border control with Qaddafi’s government.128 Not long
after Qaddafi was overthrown, cooperative border governance fell
into disarray, with Italy scrambling to cooperate with multiple
Libyan militias, often indistinguishable from migrant traffickers.129
Alongside overwhelming violence against migrants in Libyan
camps,130 and the unending catastrophe of migrant deaths at sea,131
a primary reason for the shift to anti-impunity was also a legal
development. In 2011, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor opened its
investigation into the situation in Libya, following a referral by the
UN Security Council. 132 The investigation came to buttress an
argument that crimes against migrants and refugees were
committed.
Indeed, in her statement of May 8, 2017, the ICC Prosecutor
explained to the UN Security Council that the investigation also
concerns “serious and widespread crimes against migrants
attempting to transit through Libya.” 133 Fatou Bensouda labeled
128
Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between the Italian
Republic and the Great Libyan Arab Giamariria, It.-Libya (Oct. 23, 2008),
https://www.repubblica.it/2008/05/sezioni/esteri/libia-italia/testo-accordo/tes
to-accordo.html [https://perma.cc/ME3F-DD26].
129 See, e.g., Lorenzo Tondo, Human Trafficker Was at Meeting in Italy to Discuss
Libya
Migration,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
4,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/04/human-trafficker-at-meetin
g-italy-libya-migration-abd-al-rahman-milad
[https://perma.cc/WQ4J-J2YU]
(explaining the suspected involvement of traffickers in the Libyan coastguard).
130 See MEHMET ENES BEŞER & FATIMAH ELFEITORI, LIBYA DETENTION CENTRES: A
STATE OF IMPUNITY 6 (2018) (describing human rights violations and conditions in
Libyan detention centers).
131
Id. at 2; see also Alessio Perrone, Italy: Navy, Coastguard Officials Charged in
Migrant
Deaths,
AL
JAZEERA
(Sep.
16,
2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/16/italy-navy-coastguard-officials-ch
arged-in-migrant-deaths [https://perma.cc/JL6J-TTYR] (highlighting the death of
thousands of migrants trying to reach Italy by sea).
132
ICC: Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 3,
2011),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/03/icc-prosecutor-openinvestigation-libya# [https://perma.cc/26M5-HCM6].
133 Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security
Council on the Situation in Libya, ¶ 25 (May 9, 2017), https://www.icccpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=170509-otp-stat-lib
[https://perma.cc/9DSE9TBC]; see also FOURTEENTH REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR
1970 (2011) (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-unsc-lib-112017-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CEX-TVU3] (assessing the situation in Libya
and whether actions taken there amount to crimes against humanity).
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Libya as a “marketplace for the trafficking of human beings”134 and
said that “thousands of vulnerable migrants, including women and
children, are being held in detention centers across Libya in often
inhumane condition.”135 Bensouda, in word but so-far not in deed,
joined the anti-impunity push to defend migrants and refugees. She
concluded a later address to the UN Security Council with the
emphatic observation that if the ICC does not pursue its mandate in
Libya, “impunity will reign . . . . This, we cannot allow.”136 As the
unspeakable violence against migrants in Libya was widely
reported in global news media, it also became clear that European
actors were complicit in aiding Libyan forces. This could potentially
implicate European actors in crimes.137
Comparable to the role criminologists played in the Australian
context, two social scientists contributed significantly to the new
discourse in the Mediterranean. Anthropologist Maurizio Albahari
made a relevant contribution with his Crimes of Peace in 2015. 138
Documenting drownings and border violence, he described
“methodical negligence, ill-conceived policies, and well-oiled
criminal networks.” 139
Drawing ambiguous relations with
categories of criminal law, Albahari explains that “[r]ather than
unveiling guilt, investigating crimes of peace deals with explicating
events, situations, mechanisms, and networks of correlations—
possibly conveying legal and political responsibilities.” 140
Furthermore, “[c]rimes of peace do not need intentionality: they
may bank on the variable interest of unequally distributed
‘tragedies.’” 141 Albahari’s ambivalence on issues of mens rea—or
indeed on the question of agency versus structure—illustrates the
broader predicament of extending anti-impunity from
Bensouda, supra note 133, ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 26.
136 Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security
Council on the Situation in Libya, para. 56 (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_lib_unsc [https://perma.cc/9E6W-8U5J].
137
Itamar Mann, Violeta Moreno-Lax & Omer Shatz, Time to Investigate
European Agents for Crimes Against Migrants in Libya, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/time-to-investigate-european-agents-for-crimes-against
-migrants-in-libya/#more-16057 [https://perma.cc/Y3P2-5FP2] (supporting and
urging investigation of Europe’s involvement in migrant abuse).
138
MAURIZIO ALBAHARI, CRIMES OF PEACE: MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATIONS AT THE
WORLD’S DEADLIEST BORDER 22 (2015).
139 Id.
140
Id.
141 Id.
134
135
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authoritarianism and war to migration. His intervention is therefore
comparable to the work of Penny Green and Mike Grewcock in the
Australian context examined above.142 In both cases, the criminal
law framing articulated by social scientists is not intended as a
formal legal argument and is more of a metaphor invoked for
primarily expressive purposes.
In their ground-breaking work, interdisciplinary researchers
Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani of “Forensic Oceanography”
(“FO”) investigated European and Italian failures to rescue asylum
seekers and migrants in the central Mediterranean.143 In a series of
reports published from 2014-18, FO constantly alluded to legal
categories.144 Through their work, patterns of state responsibility for
actions and omissions that violated migrant rights became visible.145
Alongside state responsibility, their allusions to the law of the sea’s
duty of rescue, and sometimes to criminal law, seemed to expose
aspects of individual responsibility as well. When a vessel avoids
performing a rescue, the arrow of accountability is split between its
captain and its flag state. 146 The question of where should
accountability stop raises interesting philosophical questions but is
also a matter of strategy. The underlying legal questions often
require considering the overlap and disjuncture between these
different areas of law, including human rights law, criminal law,
and the law of the sea.147 Whether on the legal or “merely” the moral
levels, what they exposed appeared to some of us as an atrocity of
historic dimensions.
Against a backdrop of tragic events in the central Mediterranean,
an Italian prosecutor was the first to initiate an actual criminal
Green & Grewcock, supra note 64.
See About the Project, VISIBLE, https://www.visibleproject.org
/blog/project/forensic-oceanography-various-locations-in-europe-and-northernafrica/ [https://perma.cc/97N8-8J79] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021) (describing Forensic
Oceanography, a project investigating the militarized border regime in the
Mediterranean Sea).
144
Itamar Mann, Killing by Omission, EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 20, 2016),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/killing-by-omission/ [https://perma.cc/88MK-6HES].
145 See, e.g., Charles Heller & Lorenzo Pezzani, Ebbing and Flowing: The EU’s
Shifting Practices of (Non-) Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis, NEAR FUTURES
ONLINE,
http://nearfuturesonline.org/ebbing-and-flowing-the-eus-shiftingpractices-of-non-assistance-and-bordering-in-a-time-of-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/GYA3-47C3] (using Forensic Oceanography research to better
understand migrant abuse).
146
See Mann, supra note 144.
147
It should be disclosed that I often had the fortune of following their work
closely and the privilege of serving as their legal advisor.
142
143
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investigation against a violator of migrant rights. His target was
then Italian Minister of Interior, Matteo Salvini. Luigi Patronaggio
of Catania, Sicily, acted in August 2018 on the premise that the
Minister’s refusal to allow 177 rescued migrants to debark from a
Coastguard vessel amounted to “kidnapping.”148 The investigation
concluded with a decision to prosecute the far-right Salvini for the
crime.149 However, under Italian immunity rules, such prosecution
must be voted upon in the parliament.150 In February 2019, Salvini
avoided facing a trial thanks to an online vote.151 Within the short
history of anti-impunity rhetoric on behalf of migrants, the mere
launching of an investigation was a rare and remarkable occasion.
Often, we have merely seen calls for prosecution or investigation,
without any real response by prosecuting authorities. At best,
activists put together people’s tribunals, as was the case, for
example, in Stockholm and Barcelona.152 Here, anti-impunity comes
from a state official. An elected branch of government halted the
move of a member of its bureaucracy and thus refused the criminal
law framing. The instance may be perceived as feeding into a
narrative of collaboration between a bureaucratic class of civil
servants and human rights lawyer-activists against elected officials
and popular will. Such perceptions should today be on the minds
of lawyer activists and demand our urgent consideration.
In June 2019, lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco authored an
Article 15 communication equating the entire European and Italian
policy in the central Mediterranean during 2014-19 to multiple

148
See Lorenzo Tondo, Salvini Defiant over Investigation into Illegal Detention of
Migrants,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
22,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/illegal-detention-italianministers-bar-on-migrant-ship-probed
[https://perma.cc/9RMV-4GF6]
(describing Salvini’s attitude towards the investigation into his refusal to allow 177
migrants to leave a coastguard vessel in Catania); Davide Vampa, Matteo Salvini
Just Avoided Facing a Kidnap Trial – Thanks to an Online Vote, CONVERSATION (Feb. 20,
2019), https://theconversation.com/matteo-salvini-just-avoided-facing-a-kidnaptrial-thanks-to-an-online-vote-111979 [https://perma.cc/9RMV-4GF6].
149
Vampa, supra note 148.
150 Id.
151
Id.
152
See generally Andrew Byrnes & Gabrielle Simm, International Peoples’
Tribunals: Their Nature, Practice and Significance, in PEOPLES’ TRIBUNALS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (Andrew Byrnes & Gabrielle Simm, eds. 2018) (analyzing
the history of modern international peoples’ tribunals).
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international crimes. 153 Relying primarily on FO’s work for their
factual account, the submission argues for the investigation of
European actors for a variety of crimes against humanity, including:
murder (Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute); enslavement (Article
7(1)(c)); rape (Article 7(1)(g)); deportation (Article 7(1)(d)); unlawful
imprisonment (Article 7(1)(e)) torture (Article 7(1)(f)); persecution
(Article 7(1)(h)) and other inhumane acts (Article 7(1)(k)). 154 In
interviews, the two suggested possible defendants may not be
limited to someone like EU representative Federica Mogherini,
whose name comes up in the relevant evidence.155 They direct their
accusations towards Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, as
well.156
The communication applies international criminal law to alleged
systematic omissions to act upon rescue duties at sea.157 Beyond its
legal analysis, the communication made an enormous bang in
international media, with leading newspapers across many
countries giving it central coverage. 158 Multiple European
parliaments and universities hosted events discussing the topic.
153
Omer Shatz & Juan Branco, Communication to the Office of Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court Pursuant to the Article 15 of the Rome Statute, EU
Migration Policies in Central Mediterranean and Libya (2014-2019), at 8 (June 3, 2019),
https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2019/jun/eu-icc-case-E
U-Migration-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSF3-XUC6].
154
Id. ¶¶ 163, 167, 173, 177, 179, 182, 185, 188.
155
Id. ¶ 386; Von Fabian Hillebrand, Strafrechtlich eine einfache
Angelegenheit [A Simple Matter under Criminal Law], ND (Oct. 11, 2019)
https://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/1127023.omer-shatz-strafrechtlich-ei
ne-einfache-angelegenheit.html?fbclid=IwAR1s0Zpz0lk5ekddJepN7TSj1QxAfBIq
pNUA_AEFMdL-6p9_GC0u1NNIe_c [https://perma.cc/3W9P-D7M6].
156
See also Owen Bowcott, ICC Submission Calls for Prosecution of EU over
Migrant
Deaths,
GUARDIAN
(June
3,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jun/03/icc-submission-calls-for-prose
cution-of-eu-over-migrant-deaths [https://perma.cc/DUB4-DAEE] (describing
the submission to the ICC accusing various European leaders of migrant abuse).
157
Shatz & Branco, supra note 153, ¶¶ 6-12.
158 See Bowcott, supra note 156; Emma Sofia Dedorson, Meet the Lawyer Taking
the EU Migration Policy to the ICC, EUOBSERVER (June 14, 2019),
https://euobserver.com/news/145162
[https://perma.cc/3MGP-M556]
(interviewing Branco, one of the lawyers who wants to see European Union officials
and member states prosecuted at the ICC for abusive migration policies); Kerstin
Carlson, Migration: Time For the ICC to Put European Leaders on Trial, AFR. REP. (July
26, 2019), https://www.theafricareport.com/15694/migration-time-for-the-iccput-european-leaders-on-trial/ [https://perma.cc/N72M-M6HD] (describing the
decision the ICC faces after two lawyers filed a complaint naming European
member states’ migration policies in the Mediterranean as crimes against
humanity).
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This attention reflects how captivating the anti-impunity narrative
about the central Mediterranean has become for popular audiences
globally. Based on its record thus far, it remains hard to believe that
the Office of the Prosecutor will do anything about this
communication. And yet, the public reception seems to prove that
the criminal law framing has been successful in capturing the
imaginations of many.
iii. The United States
Just like in the Australian and European cases, the American
roots of the new anti-impunity are also found two decades back.
Here, however, they are different. Rather than anything directly
related to the Rome Statute coming into force, they grew out of the
aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Responding
to the attacks, the United States reorganized its border enforcement.
Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress consolidated
all border patrol agencies into the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”).159 In March 2003, the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) and the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) agencies were established, both under the
umbrella of DHS. 160 In hindsight, we now know that this
reorganization entrenched and consolidated border violence, as well
as the lack of accountability for it.161
As emphasized above, the anti-impunity discourse first emerged
in the context of war and authoritarianism. The recreation of the
U.S. border enforcement system, and particularly the ascendance of
CBP and ICE, quickly led to the militarization of U.S. borders. The
establishment of a quasi-military environment on the U.S.-Mexican
border prepared the ground for an anti-impunity discourse on
migration. Indeed, during the first decade of the twenty-first
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
CBP Through the Years, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (May 5,
2021), https://www.cbp.gov/ [https://perma.cc/8A9Y-GDBA]; History of ICE,
U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.ice.gov/history
[https://perma.cc/PW4Z-HTQ5].
161
This is, of course, not to say that border violence is an entirely new or
unprecedented phenomenon. For a look at previous decades, see generally Jorge
A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and
International Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1 (2001) (detailing the history of
U.S. border violence against Mexican migratory workers).
159
160
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century, the environment on the U.S.-Mexican border became both
more war-like and more authoritarian:
[I]t has become entirely normal to look up into the Arizona
sky and to see Blackhawk helicopters and fixed-wing jets
flying by . . . [and to] hear Predator B drones buzzing . . .
[that] are equipped with the same kind of ‘man-hunting’
[radar] that flew over the Dashti Margo desert region in
Afghanistan.162
Just like in the burgeoning field of national security law, a
militarized environment becomes intertwined with criminal law. In
a foundational articulation of this development, in 2006, legal
scholar Juliet Stumpf introduced the study of “crimmigration.” 163
Crimmigration refers to the intense conversion between
immigration enforcement and criminal law during the period, and
indeed ever since. 164 As Stumpf explained, the two become only
“nominally separate.”165
Stumpf’s intervention, which has also become influential in the
Australian and European contexts I have described above, makes
what is now likely a familiar claim: criminal law has become a major
administrative avenue through which the border is being enforced
and managed. As criminal law became a central category for
thinking about migration, anti-impunity became a natural step to
take. The European developments I have described above in the
struggle against smuggling have a direct American parallel,
embodied in efforts to criminalize trafficking worldwide (and to
expand the category). This push to criminal law began during the
George W. Bush administration and continued during the Obama
administration. Like in the Australian and the European contexts,
part of its vocabulary included analogies to slavery. 166 Anti162
Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners at 6, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S.Ct. 735
(2020) (N. 17-1678) (quoting Todd Miller, War on the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/opinion/sunday/war-on-theborder.html [https://perma.cc/BW9A-4G2Z]). On the notion of “manhunting,”
see GRÉGOIRE CHAMAYOU, A THEORY OF THE DRONE 30-36 (Janet Lloyd trans., 2015).
163
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 368 (2006). Stumpf is widely credited for the term,
even though she was not the first to invoke it.
164
Id. at 381.
165 Id. at 376.
166
Chuang, supra note 10, at 623-24.
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impunity appears in this context as an instrument of transnational
governance.167 Importantly, we also see this move to criminal law
in the language through which gang violence is addressed during
this period. Starting from the first decade of the twenty-first
century, gang violence was identified as one of the major drivers of
unauthorized migration.168 In the fields of development and human
rights, the issue often came to be regarded as one of impunity. Like
in Europe, the term was also employed in the United States to
address smuggling networks, which in both regional contexts
established the material infrastructure for unauthorized entries.169
Various actors pushed for greater criminal accountability in
Mexico, as part of an agenda that presented itself as one of border
security and human rights at one and the same time. 170 These
included government actors, NGOs, and UN circles. “[I]mpunity
for human rights abuses against migrants is rampant,” wrote UN
Special Rapporteur on Migrant Rights, Jorge Bustamante, in 2008.171
“With the pervasiveness of corruption at all levels of government
and the close relationship that many authorities have with gang
networks, incidences of extortion, rape and assault of migrants
continue.”172
Rereading Stumpf in the context of the history of anti-impunity,
the relationship between the national security emergency and the
criminalization of migrants becomes abundantly clear. The United
States’ use of offshore detention facilities in Guantánamo and other
“black sites” only started to become visible in the public discussion

Id. at 623.
Julia G. Young, The Situation at the U.S.-Mexico Border Can’t be ‘Solved’
Without Acknowledging its Origins, Time (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://time.com/5951532/migration-factors/ [https://perma.cc/ZYR5-PBXT].
169
On the notion of “infrastructure” and its application in this context, see
generally Thomas Spijkerboer, The Global Mobility Infrastructure: Reconceptualizing
the Externalisation of Migration Control, 20 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 452 (2018).
170 See, e.g., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L. DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG
ASSESSMENT 10-11, 31-32 (2006), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG834.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VA2C-5Z5X]; AMNESTY INT’L, INVISIBLE VICTIMS: MIGRANTS ON
THE
MOVE
IN
MEXICO
(2010),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/amr410142010eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3NSU-N2L5].
171
Jorge Bustamante (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants),
Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/11/7/Add.2 (Mar. 24, 2009).
172
Id.
167
168
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with high-profile cases in the Supreme Court.173 Imagining a future
in which the criminalization of immigration continues, Stumpf takes
a page from the national security playbook. She envisions that it is
the year 2017, and the United States has continued on its path of
criminalizing migration.174 The result is that detention facilities are
over-populated, and a network of offshore detention sites has been
established in faraway places.175 For example, Israel is in the role
that Nauru and Papua New Guinea play for Australia: it provides
the United States with offshore immigration detention services
(specifically for Muslim detainees).176
This allusion to national security cooperation is especially
pertinent to the discussion of anti-impunity in the U.S. migration
context. Beyond the impunity of criminal gangs in Mexico, it starts
to expose the sensibility I have focused on in my analyses of
Australia and the European Union: that border enforcement has
evolved into a global plot to circumvent basic human rights rules,
and create “legal black holes” (to use the term of the day for
Guantánamo).177 In Stumpf’s imagined scenario, European States
respond to the United States’ violation of fundamental human rights
rules by imposing economic sanctions upon the United States. 178
True, this is not a tool of international criminal justice; arguably,
however, it belongs to the same “family” of international legal tools,
reserved for the worst of actors within the international
community.179 That economic sanctions against the United States
become imaginable in the mid-2000s reflects the dread some
scholars start to feel when witnessing the emergence of carceral
border policies. Little could Stumpf know, at the time, that Europe
would be developing its own version of such carceral policies.

173 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006).
174
See Stumpf, supra note 163, at 368-75.
175
Id.
176 See id. at 374-75.
177 Cf. Mann, supra note 47, at 347 (exploring “the trope of the ‘legal black hole’
to reveal questions of legal theory arising from contemporary migrant drownings”).
178
See Stumpf, supra note 163, at 375.
179
After all, Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, through which the UN Security
Council imposes “coercive measures”, has been historically employed both to
impose economic sanctions and to establish international criminal tribunals. See
DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII
OF THE UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 109, 116 (2001).
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The description in the quote above, of the U.S.-Mexico border as
a zone of man-hunting drones, is taken from an amicus brief.180 On
August 9, 2019, CBP officials submitted it to the United States
Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Mesa.181 Though the brief is recent,
the underlying set of facts concern the killing of a 15-year-old
Mexican teenager, Sergio Hernandez, back in 2010.182 The brief thus
shed remarkable light on the development of border policies during
the preceding decade and provides considerable insight on the
American version of the new impunity. Addressing the underlying
facts, Roxana Altholz writes that CBP’s immunity for border killings
stems from the fact that “all victims of border killings, regardless of
geographic location of the harm, lack effective access to a
remedy.”183
For example, it is worth highlighting what might be referred to
as, paraphrasing Chuang, “impunity creep.” 184 As the brief
emphasizes, starting from the mid-2000s, CBP and ICE often hired
personnel with deep connections to criminal organizations in
Mexico, including cartel members. 185 The suggestion is that
impunity, normalized on the southern side of the border, was thus
invited into the U.S.’s border control agencies. Furthermore, the
former officials talk about a culture of protectionism within the
agencies, which systematically thwarts efforts to impose
disciplinary or criminal measures upon agents when appropriate.186
These internal norms both reflect and further solidify patterns of
violence that have been carried forward all the way to the present:
“Between 2003 and May 2018 Border Patrol agents have killed at
least 97 people, including 28 US citizens and six children.” 187
180
Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners, supra note 162.
181
Hernandez v. Mesa, Proceedings and Orders, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hernandez-v-mesa-2/https://ww
w.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hernandez-v-mesa-2/
[https://perma.cc/KWU8-JANS].
182
Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners, supra note 162, at 32.
183
Roxanna Altholz, Elusive Justice: Legal Redress for Killings by U.S. Border
Agents, 27 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 5 (2017).
184 See Chuang, supra note 10.
185
Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners, supra note 162, at 3.
186
Id. at 23-28.
187
Linda Green, COVID-19 and Legalized Criminality: Notes from the Arizona
Borderlands, Part 2, 44 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 265, 265 (2020).
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Hernandez was one of these people, and his family sued in order to
obtain a civil remedy, but was barred from doing so under the
doctrine of qualified immunity. The case, which the Supreme Court
has not yet decided as I write, seeks a finding that federal courts
should recognize a damages claim if plaintiffs plausibly allege that
a rogue federal law enforcement officer violated clearly established
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for which there is no alternative
legal remedy. The amici start their submission with a clear
statement:
Sergio Hernández should not have been killed. He was an
unarmed teen who did not pose an imminent threat to the
U.S. Border Patrol agent, Respondent Jesus Mesa, Jr., who
shot him. But because of conditions within the Border Patrol,
similar incidents will likely continue to occur if agents
cannot be held accountable in civil suits.188
They then add: “Without the possibility of civil liability, the
unlikely prospect of discipline or criminal prosecution will not
provide a meaningful deterrent to abuse at the border.” 189 The
Hernandez case began “[a]fter President Obama’s Department of
Justice declined to charge Mesa.”190 The brief illustrates, perhaps
better than any other set of sources, how the extreme violence at the
border and an utter lack of accountability for that violence
developed during his administration. Indeed, President Barack
Obama increased migrant deportations to an unprecedented rate,
while allowing others amnesty and paths to citizenship.191
Yet, arguably, only as a response to President Donald Trump’s
anti-immigrant policies, often couched in explicitly racist
language, 192 did activists and politicians turn in earnest to a
188
Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners, supra note 162, at 3.
189 Id. at 4.
190
Mark Joseph Stern, Sonia Sotomayor Raises the Alarm over Border Patrol’s
Lawless Brutality, SLATE (Nov. 13, 2019), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2019/11/hernandez-supreme-court-oral-arguments-sotomayor-borderpatrol.html [https://perma.cc/FH8Y-JFSX].
191
Serena Marshall, Obama has Deported More People than Any Other President,
ABCNEWS (Aug. 29, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-deportationpolicy-numbers/story?id=41715661 [https://perma.cc/R5BZ-4MK4].
192
Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Stoking Fears, Trymp Defied
Bureaucracy to Advance Immigration Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/23/us/politics/trump-immigration.html?_r
=1 [https://perma.cc/MTE4-D3MV].
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vocabulary of impunity. During the Obama era we talked about the
militarization of the border.193 During the Trump era, we have seen
repeated deployments of actual troops along the border.
Particularly central to the discourse of anti-impunity have been
“child separation” policies, as well as punitive detention and
deportation measures. 194 A significant part of the anti-impunity
discourse in the United States has focused on ICE. In August 2018
Zephyr Teachout, a progressive New York lawyer who ran for New
York Attorney General, expressed her view in a campaign video
that, “ICE was born in xenophobia in the time after 9/11, and has
grown up to become a tool of fear and illegality.”195 She therefore
promised that, “as Attorney General, I will continue to speak out
against ICE, I will prosecute ICE for their criminal acts. . . . The idea
that we can call this law enforcement is a real offense to the idea of
law itself.”196 The left-wing candidate and Fordham law professor
was ultimately not elected, but nonetheless received the
endorsement of the New York Times; a forerunner of endorsing
migration anti-impunity in liberal media.197
In the following months, several major American human rights
organizations, as well as highly regarded legal commentators,
advanced the argument that child separation policies at the border
legally constituted torture. Like in the Australian and European
contexts, the centrality of torture to the criminal law argument
stemmed from torture being both a human rights violation and a
criminal offense.198 Beth Van Schaack, a law professor at Stanford
and a former State Department official, authored a remarkable piece

193
See Joel Rose, President Obama Also Faced a ‘Crisis’ at the Southern Border, npr
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/09/683623555/president-obamaalso-faced-a-crisis-at-the-southern-border [https://perma.cc/PKU6-F3GQ].
194 See Linnaea Honl-Stuenkel, John Kelly Cashes in On Child Separation Policy
He Pushed, CREW (May 9, 2019), https://www.citizensforethics.org/john-kellychild-separation-policy/
[https://perma.cc/3KKA-SGQ7]
(describing
immigration policies in the Trump administration).
195 Zephyr Teachout, Zephyr Teachout Is Promising to Prosecute ICE, NOWTHIS
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://nowthisnews.com/videos/politics/zephyr-teachout-ispromising-to-prosecute-ice [https://perma.cc/LP6K-EBEV].
196
Id.
197
Ed. Bd., Opinion, The New York Times Endorses Zephyr Teachout for Attorney
General
in
Thursday’s
Primary,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/opinion/zephyr-teachout-new-yorkattorney-general.html [https://perma.cc/7NUW-4SZ5].
198
Under federal law in the United States: 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
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on the torture of migrants in October 2018.199 Her analysis of the
Trump administration’s engagement in torture relies both on the
international legal definition and on domestic criminal law.200 She
emphasizes a facet of the policy “acutely relevant to the U.S.
definition of mental torture,” namely the unlawful drugging of
children. 201 As Van Schaack points out, “the administration of
mind-altering substances or procedures to disrupt the victim’s
senses” has been specifically included in the U.S. Senate’s list of
policies constituting mental torture.202 While she doesn’t spell it out,
the outcome of her analysis is clear: the perpetrators of torture
against “[b]oth [p]arents and [c]hildren,” presumably U.S. border
enforcement agents and political appointees—perhaps including the
President—may in the future be targets of criminal prosecution.203
199
Beth Van Schaack, The Torture of Forcibly Separating Children from Their
Parents, JUST SEC. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61138/tortureforcibly-separating-children-parents/ [https://perma.cc/T3S6-A6E9]; Beth Van
Schaack, JUST SEC., https://www.justsecurity.org/author/vanschaackbeth/
[perma.cc/5C3U-KGFA].
200
Van Schaack, supra note 199.
201 Id. Judge Dolly M. Gee has found that children in detention are being overmedicated and administered psychotropic drugs without parental consent or
judicial authorization through a court order. Richard Gonzales, Federal Judge Orders
Government to Seek Consent before Medicating Migrant Children, NPR (July 30, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/30/634171415/federal-judge-orders-governmentto-seek-consent-before-medicating-migrant-childr
[https://perma.cc/98TGCB9W]. Separated children in detention have alleged that they had been forced to
take multiple psychotropic medications simultaneously. Samantha Schmidt, Trump
Administration Must Stop Giving Psychotropic Drugs to Migrant Children Without
Consent, Judge Rules, WASH. POST: MORNING MIX (July 31, 2018, 6:38 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/07/31/trump
-administration-must-seek-consent-before-giving-drugs-to-migrant-children-judg
e-rules/ [https://perma.cc/9R4D-33GF]. These medications, which react with the
central nervous system, can have long-term side effects (hallucinations, self-harm,
suicidal ideation, etc.) when administered to adolescents or children. M.B. v. Corsi,
No. 2:17-cv-04102-NKL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3232 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2018).
Lawyers have alleged that detention facility personnel are administering these
medications solely to control the behavior and “pacify” the children and not
because the children have a psychiatric disorder in need of treatment. Id. See also
Michael E. Miller, ‘I Want to Die’: Was a 5-year-old Drugged After Being Separated from
His
Dad
at
the
Border?,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
9,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/i-want-to-die-was-a-5-year-old-drugge
d-after-being-separated-from-his-dad-at-the-border/2018/08/08/df4cc2aa-95e111e8-a679-b09212fb69c2_story.html [https://perma.cc/4B6C-8898].
202 Van Schaack, supra note 199; see also MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RL32276, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S.
IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 5 (2009),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32276.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VN2-VA6E].
203
Van Schaack, supra note 199.
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When it was revealed in December 2018 that migrants detained at
the border are kept in freezing cells nicknamed ‘iceboxes’ (Las
Hieleras), such concerns about torture were once again aggravated.204
A legal clinic at New York University School of Law submitted
another notable amici brief in February 2019, making torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment arguments. 205 This brief was
submitted on behalf of a list of human rights groups and law
professors.206 It reads: “the forcible separation of minor children
from the adult(s) with who they have a parental relationship and
with whom they migrate, as in the case of [redacted for privacy] and
her son, to deter immigration, constitutes torture under
international law.” 207 Notably, child separation also raised the
specter of enforced disappearances, which have long been central to
anti-impunity rhetoric, especially in the context of struggles against
authoritarianism.208
Echoing some of the Australian and European analyses of
migrant detention for “deterrence” purposes, the NYU clinic also
alleged that “the U.S. government’s routine and non-exceptional
detention of arriving asylum seekers like Mrs. De Faria Teixeira,
without a meaningful individualized custody determination or
independent review, and for an unlawful purpose, violates the
prohibition on arbitrary detention under international law.”209 A
similar analysis may apply to the force-feeding of hunger strikers in
migrant detention facilities, revealed around the same time.210
204
Mariana Alfaro, Migrants Detained at the Border are Kept in Freezing Cells
Nicknamed ‘Iceboxes’ — Here’s What We Know About Them, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 27, 2018,
12:05 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/migrants-detained-at-border-keptin-freezing-cells-nicknamed-iceboxes-2018-12 [https://perma.cc/YPH5-8RTW].
205
Unopposed Motion of Global Justice Clinic et al. for Leave to File Brief
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner’s Habeas Corpus Petition Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, De Faria Teixeira v. Whitaker, EP-19-CV-43-KC (W.D. Tex. 2019).
206
Id.
207 Id.
208
See Alonso Gurmendi, On Calling Things What They Are: Family Separation
and Enforced Disappearance of Children, OPINIOJURIS (June 24, 2019),
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/06/24/on-calling-things-what-they-are-family-separ
ation-and-enforced-disappearance-of-children/ [https://perma.cc/942G-GT8K]
(detailing enforced disappearances).
209
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner Valquiria de Faria Teixeira’s
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, De Faria Teixeira
v. Whitaker, EP-19-CV-43-KC (W.D. Tex. 2019).
210
US: Cease Force-Feeding Migrant Hunger Strikers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 19,
2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/19/us-cease-force-feeding-migrant-
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Perhaps the fieriest moment unfolded on June 17, 2019, when
Democratic Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez took to
Instagram to protest the “fascist presidency” “running
concentration camps.”211 Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
has become one of the most influential leaders of the party, and her
words echoed far and wide. In the coming days, then presidential
candidate and former Attorney General of California, Kamala
Harris, repeatedly claimed that the President’s treatment of
migrants is “a crime against humanity.”212 One wonders whether
Harris had intended, would she have been elected President, to
instruct federal prosecutors to act accordingly. For their own parts,
celebrities including Cher, J.K. Rowling, Bette Midler, and many
more tweeted in vociferous agreement.213 The looming specter of
concentration camps, echoing World War II Nazi prisons and the
United States internment of Japanese citizens, came with a veritable
anti-impunity eruption.214
To be sure, some found this eruption inappropriate or even
intimidating. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, for

hunger-strikers [https://perma.cc/7DTA-UDJP]. More recently, see Noah Lanard,
ICE Is Force-Feeding Hunger Strikers, in Violation of Medical Ethics, MOTHER JONES (Jan.
16, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/01/ice-is-force-feedinghunger-strikers-in-violation-of-medical-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/5V6Y-LMYE].
211
Tim Hains, Ocasio-Cortez: “Fascist Presidency” is Running “Concentration
Camps” On The Southern Border, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (June 18, 2019),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/06/18/ocasio-cortez_trump_ad
ministration_is_running_concentration_camps_on_the_souther_border.html
[https://perma.cc/D856-GEQ8].
212
See Susan Jones, Kamala Harris: Immigration Raids Are ‘A Crime Against
Humanity’,
CNSNEWS
(July
12,
2019),
https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/kamala-harris-immigratio
n-raids-are-crime-against-humanity [https://perma.cc/5ZME-8Y49]; see also John
Bowden, Kamala Harris: Trump’s Treatment of Migrants is ‘A Crime Against Humanity’,
HILL (June 22, 2018, 7:10 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/393742kamala-harris-trump-treatment-of-migrants-is-a-crime-against-humanity
[https://perma.cc/NEE3-R8NT].
213 Here Are All the Celebs Weighing in on the Trump Administration’s Separation
of
Children
at
the
Border,
AMERICA’S VOICE
(June
18,
2018),
https://americasvoice.org/blog/celebrities-separation-border/
[https://perma.cc/E53B-ER7X].
214
On the relevance of concentration camp trials for contemporary
international criminal law, see Durwood “Derry” Riedel, The U.S. War Crimes
Tribunals at the Former Dachau Concentration Camp: Lessons for Today?, 24 BERKELEY J.
INT’L. L. 554 passim (2006) (emphasizing, inter alia, that not all “concentration camps”
were similar to each other).
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example, expressed criticism of such comparisons. 215 As I write
these words, however, activists deploying an anti-impunity rhetoric
to defend migrants continue to display enormous energy. On July
27, 2019, protestors gathered on the D.C. National Mall, chanting
“never again!”216 Similar events are unfolding in other American
cities.217
Perhaps because the United States is not a member of the Rome
Statute, the turn to anti-impunity in the United States did not focus
on international criminal law. As it unfolded in the build-up to the
November 2020 elections, it was characterized by a much more
popular tone. This is not to say international law did not have a role
here. A political imagination of mass atrocities and their historical
memory, with an implicit allusion to law, has been just as important.
b. A Global Trend
The analysis above focuses on the fault lines between
“developed” and “developing” countries. And yet, the turn to the
new anti-impunity in the context of migration is arguably global. To
name just two other apposite examples, the ICC prosecutor may
seek to assert accountability for the violation of rights of Rohingya
refugees fleeing Myanmar.218 On January 23, 2020, the International
215
See Edna Friedberg, Why Holocaust Analogies Are Dangerous, U.S.
HOLOCAUST
MEM’L
MUSEUM
(Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.ushmm.org/information/press/press-releases/why-holocaust-ana
logies-are-dangerous [https://perma.cc/M9PJ-3TCJ].
216
See Alex Graf, Activists March in DC Calling for ‘Dignity Not Detention’ for
Migrants, GLOBE POST (July 16, 2019), https://theglobepost.com/2019/07/16/dcnever-again-march/ [https://perma.cc/EZ4E-PKQN].
217
See Ben Kesslen, ‘Never Again Means Close the Camps’: Jews Protest ICE
Across
the
Country,
NBC
NEWS
(July
15,
2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/never-again-means-close-camps-jew
s-protest-ice-across-country-n1029386 [https://perma.cc/8K93-S3V3] (detailing
the July 2, 2019 protest in Boston led by Jewish groups against ICE Detention
camps).
218
See Press Release, General Assembly, Universal Ratification of Rome
Statute Crucial to Reduce Impunity for Atrocity Crimes, International Criminal
Court President Tells General Assembly, U.N. Press Release GA/12210 (Nov. 4,
2019),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12210.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/D2L8-FBTE]; see also ICC, Situation in the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19, Request for
Authorization of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15 (July 4, 2019),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03510.PDF
[https://perma.cc/Q924-5KJD].
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Court of Justice arguably joined this effort as it issued “provisional
measures” to prevent the crime of genocide against the Rohingya
minority in Myanmar. 219 Separately, the option has also been
discussed with regard to refugees from Syria.220
Working within this general context, Agnes Callamard, Special
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Execution has identified something like a
worldwide criminal scheme. Callamard, thus, starts a recent report
with a dramatic note, which I think strongly attests to the rise of
migration anti-impunity.221 Her report “is concerned with what can
only be described as a human rights and humanitarian crisis. This
crisis is characterized by mass casualties globally, a regime of
impunity for its perpetrators and an overall tolerance for its
fatalities.”222 If that is not enough, Callamard immediately explains
that she is writing about “an international crime whose very banality
in the eyes of so many makes its tragedy particularly grave and
disturbing.”223
IV.

THE CRITIQUE OF ANTI-IMPUNITY

The basic claims of the new anti-impunity have no doubt
emerged as a central and wide-ranging response to border violence.
It is therefore high time to assess it in the light of the critical literature
on anti-impunity more generally. The latter scholarship has largely
proposed progressive and leftist alternatives to “the turn to criminal
law,” and it is from this perspective that I would like to examine the
trend.224
The rise of the new anti-impunity can be explained by reference
to worsening policies towards refugees and migrants. According to
219 See Press Release, International Court of Justice, Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The
Gambia
v.
Myanmar)
(Jan.
23,
2020),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/178-20200123-PRE-0100-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5B4-YF3W].
220
See Kevin Jon Heller, Implications of the Rohingya Argument for Libya and
Syria
(and
Jordan),
OPINIO
JURIS
(Apr.
10,
2018),
http://opiniojuris.org/2018/04/10/additional-implications-of-the-otps-rohingyaargument/ [https://perma.cc/D92W-SGSB].
221
Callamard, supra note 122, at 4.
222
Id.
223 Id.
224
See, e.g., sources cited supra, note 17-18.
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this view, criminal law came to be part of the rhetoric for defending
refugees and migrants only when violations against them indeed
became criminal. Surely, there is something to that, but it can only
be part of the story. As many scholars have noted, border violence
was abundant before the beginning of the 2015 “refugee crisis,” and,
indeed, before the framing of the Rome Statute and the 9/11
attacks.225 Further, the criminality of border violence is by no means
evident, nor is it a matter of political consensus. Even with copious
evidence of horrid violence systematically directed against migrants
and refugees, the criminality of border enforcement remains
politically controversial. Save, perhaps, for an Italian investigation
against Salvini—truncated without an indictment—we have not
seen prosecutions against political leaders, or any notable state
backing for the new anti-impunity.226 In the United States context,
even under the liberal Obama administration, it has proven difficult
to impose any form of accountability on border enforcement agents
who have killed unarmed persons.227 More often, the claims of the
new anti-impunity remain the aspirations and dim threats of
activists.
The criminal law framing of border violence is the outcome of
the political choices of activists and the interpretive work of lawyers.
As such, they must be critically examined, not least by advocates
who have made such efforts. Might the vocabulary of mass atrocity
be futile, perhaps even counter-productive? What alternative
agendas, progressive or other, may anti-impunity occlude? In what
remains of this Article, I raise four salient and closely related
criticisms that have been marshalled against the turn to criminal law
in human rights. I respond to each in the more specific context of
migration, to assess the critique’s merits, as well as its
misjudgments.

225
The Berlin Wall is only one iconic example. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 101ST
CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989, at 1115–16 (Joint
Comm. Print 1990) (discussing the German Democratic Republic).
226 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
227
See Brian Bennet, Border Patrol Sees Little Reform on Agents’ Use of Force, LA
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-abuse20150223-story.html [https://perma.cc/YM7D-NKAW] (explaining how a year
after the Obama administration promised to crack down on Border Patrol, little
reform efforts had been taken).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

718

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:3

a. Justification
Critics have long argued that claims grounded in jus cogens have
the curious feature of begging the question228: What does it mean to
say that the torture or inhuman and degrading treatment of
migrants is “absolutely prohibited”? Martti Koskenniemi would
perhaps respond that this is an instance of international legal
kitsch.229 While international law surely condemns some policies,
their framing as jus cogens may fail to do the legal and political work
necessary to show why that is the case in any specific instance.
“Peremptory norms” may thus consistently fail to convince one’s
opponent.
Voicing this concern, Koskenniemi adopts a “methodological
formalism” intended to eliminate the value-laden invocation of jus
cogens.230 A legal argument resting on state consent is better than
one resting on “higher law.” By appealing to the latter, we simply
assume we are right and shrug away the need to make our case.
Relatedly, jus cogens has too often been used to cast political
opponents as villains. By taking a moral high ground, they seem to
disallow a plurality of opinions and perspectives on issues that are,
one must admit, controversial.231
In his contribution to Anti Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda,
Samuel Moyn directs this critique towards the turn to criminal law
in human rights. 232 For him, anti-impunity is a “deflection
argument.” Instead of explaining why criminalization would be
effective for the prevention or deterrence of human rights abuses,
the human rights movement has been satisfied with an obscure
retributivism: some crimes are so egregious, one simply must
prosecute. 233 Ending impunity, Moyn further remarks, advances
“political trials.”234 These are “proceedings in which the organizer
228
Martti Koskenniemi raised this objection against peremptory norms a long
time ago. See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and
Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113, 122 (2005).
229 Id.
230 Id. at 123
231
See Samuel Moyn, The Embarrassment of Human Rights, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1,
7 (2015) (disagreeing with Finnish jurist Martti Koskenniemi over the history of
international law and human rights post-World War II).
232
See generally Moyn, supra note 9.
233
Id.
234 Id. at 72; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 33 (2002).
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of the event has implicit or explicit aims beyond the ordinary
workings of the criminal justice system.” 235 Astonishingly, says
Moyn, these political ends are never properly articulated. “The
generalized slogan ‘ending impunity,’” he writes, “suggests that it
is self-evidently and unfailingly a good thing to mount such political
trials.”236 While prosecution may or may not be justified, Moyn is
alarmed that often no real justification is even attempted: “[I]ts
validity goes without saying.”237
For Moyn, the classical articulation of this unexplained
retributivism is Hannah Arendt’s defense of the Eichmann trial.238
He thus banks on her intellectual opponent, Judith Shklar, who
sought to advance a justification for the Nuremberg trials in
specifically consequentialist terms.239 The picture he paints, though
not unfamiliar, is a bleak one: trials for mass human rights
violations, particularly at the ICC, have largely been ineffective
under any consequentialist account. Since violators have been tried
and sentenced in the domestic sphere, that too is not an unmitigated
social benefit: incarceration is a social harm. Ironically, “[t]he
human rights movement emerged in opposition
to
imprisonment . . . . [I]t is surprising that it is now so focused on
throwing people in jail.” 240 As a general matter, migrant rights
lawyers—who have often focused on fighting migrant
criminalization and incarceration—surely share the latter view.241
Arendt thought that there are certain crimes for which the
perpetrator simply “must” be punished. 242 Moyn questions how
Arendt and other anti-impunity advocates arrive at this
conclusion. 243 Yet the examples of migration anti-impunity
described above shed a different light on Arendt’s retributivism.
Rather than merely “deflecting” the need to argue, they convey a
Moyn, supra note 9, at 72.
Id. at 72.
237 Id. at 71.
238
Id. at 71-72; HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL (1963).
239
Moyn, supra note 9, at 70.
240
Id. at 68
241 See, e.g., Cathryn Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject:
Immigration Detention Under International Human Rights and EU Law, 19 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 257 (2012); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration
Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012).
242
ARENDT, supra note 238, at 234-252; Moyn, supra note 9, at 70.
243
Moyn, supra note 9, at 70-71.
235
236
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specific kind of argumentative move. The basic strategy of antiimpunity arguments, as reflected in the migration context, amounts
to an attempt to reverse the burden of proof. When we call certain
policies “torture,” or we liken them to concentration camps, or
provide legal analysis according to which they amount to crimes
against humanity, what we mean to say is: “If you believe that this
kind of suffering is justifiable, you should do the work to explain it”;
a call for retribution is added for those who allow such human
suffering to go on without explanation. From this perspective, the
political conversation in which we work to convince one another
must be complemented with a more basic attention to the conditions
in which conversation proceeds. When certain boundaries on the
permissiveness of border violence are set, one may have to reject
such premises. The other side needs to first explain how, for
example, freezing migrants can be justifiable.244
This might sound weird because the burden of proof in a
criminal trial is assigned to the prosecution. This of course remains
unchanged; but when Moyn asks those seeking to criminalize gross
human rights violations to justify their campaign,245 the appropriate
response is that whoever carries out a “widespread or systematic”246
attack upon migrants needs to do the justifying. After all, the
conditions in which the conversation on migration is carried out are
themselves politically constructed, and they too can be challenged.
The way to challenge them is to reject underlying assumptions that
are supposed to render certain categories of violence towards
migrants justifiable or even invisible. Work from there.
By proceeding in such a way, the new anti-impunity partakes in
reimagining the contours of the polity. It takes the view that law is
not only about persuasion or justification within a predetermined
context. It is also about simply taking off the table certain kinds of
violence against humans in order to transform the context for any
debate to proceed. The framing of migration cannot simply be
accepted as part of the prerogative of states. To dismiss such a
reimagination as lacking justification is to assume that those who
represent the extant situation can enjoy the privilege of asking others
to justify their positions first. A deflection, perhaps; but a principled
as well as strategic one.
Alfaro, supra note 204.
Moyn, supra note 9, at 71.
246
This, once again, is the language of Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Rome
Statute, supra note 12, art. 7.
244
245
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Furthermore, in making up our minds about the need to
criminalize certain actions, their justifications, and their limitations,
we cannot simply hide behind a call for “consequentialism.” Such a
call on this issue can only make sense against the background of
political assumptions that go far beyond what consequentialism
alone would allow.
A consequentialist analysis seeking to
“optimize” the outcomes for humans the world over is nearly
impossible. Consequentialism will therefore often end up being
formulated in terms of what is better for the citizens of a specific
country. In this reformulation, however, there is already an implicit
preference for citizens over other human beings. 247 This quickly
becomes a justification for violence, potentially limitless violence. It
is hardly surprising that when it comes to migrants and refugees, a
consequentialist argument has very often had “blood on their
hands” (to return to Chetail’s formulation). 248 The “deterrence”
paradigm of border enforcement treats migration in staunchly
consequentialist terms. The paradigm has taken hold nearly
everywhere. 249 Consequentialism has also been invoked, for
example, to argue against access to asylum requests.250 It has been
recognized—sometimes even by courts—as a relevant factor for
placing migrants behind bars and sending warning messages in that
way. 251
What “deterrence” does, of course, is precisely
consequentialist in allowing the violence toward some migrants to
“deter” other would-be migrants. The underlying unarticulated
assumption—not in itself an outcome of consequentialism—is that
impervious borders are desirable for the protection of a polity. But
it is not even clear that consequentialism, in and of itself, can justify a
distinction between citizens and non-citizens at the border.
Something else is at work.
247 See, e.g., Catherine Dauvergne, Citizenship with a Vengeance, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 489, 495 (2007).
248
Chetail, supra note 78, at 917.
249 See Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway, Non-Refoulement
in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 235 passim (2015)
(providing a discussion on states’ responsibility for aiding migrants and the
relationship to international migrant law).
250
See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS 13 (2012); see generally Mann, supra note 62, at 380 (arguing that
“[p]ragmatic policy solutions are operative in the continuous exposure of
unauthorized migrants from developing countries to inhumane and degrading
treatment and refoulment”).
251
See HCJ 8665/14 Tashuma Dasta v. The Knesset, 1, 20 (2015) (Isr.) (finding
that deterrence can only be the purpose of immigrant detention if it is accompanied
by another policy purpose).
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To argue against U.S. government lawyers, who say that it is
prudent to deny soap to migrant detainees,252 it is not enough to
“rationally” engage (e.g., by discussing probable health risks). It is
unlikely that those who support such policies would be convinced
by an appeal to statute or treaty law, where they would ignore a jus
cogens argument. Such individuals should simply not be answered
on their own terms. With respect to the spirit of compromise
described above, the new anti-impunity is a self-conscious
vocabulary of partisanship. 253 It is neither deflection nor proper
justification set out to convey as well as to recruit political power.254
Consider a relevant explanation to the concentration camp
analogies, by historian Timothy Snyder. Analogies to past atrocities
are a central tenet of anti-impunity, generally. In a short piece,
Snyder explained: “Analogizing is not some mysterious operation:
It is how we think. . . . ‘Never again’ is nothing other than an
invocation of that process.”255 According to Snyder, we reach back
to the past to illuminate the present: “Once we understand
something about the history of the Holocaust, we make our way
forward again, seeing patterns we would have missed. If we notice
a dangerous one, we should act.”256 Giving up on analogies in favor
of purely consequentialist reasoning may allow atrocities to return.
252
See Kate Cronin-Furman, The Treatment of Migrants Likely ‘Meets the
Definition
of
a
Mass
Atrocity’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
29,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/opinion/immigration-children-detentio
n.html [https://perma.cc/55DJ-XS2C].
253
To use a term Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro coined, anti-impunity
arguments are designed to “outcast” opponents. Oona Hathaway & Scott J.
Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252
passim (2011).
254
Kate Cronin-Furman advanced an argument about the merits of such
rhetoric. Cronin-Furman, supra note 252. For her, the criminal law vocabulary
allows a focus on individuals, which will then impose on them a personal cost. Id.
Even if they are not ultimately prosecuted, the idea is that those involved in
something like child separation will become ashamed within their social circles, and
that their reputations will suffer. Id. While I am not entirely sure such a strategy is
always warranted, it is a strategic choice, which may advance a political struggle
(or backfire against it). It therefore makes no sense to abandon or discard the tools
of criminal law in the struggle against border violence. Of course, advocates using
it must be self-conscious and sensitive to the likely outcomes, and cognizant of both
short-term and long-term effects. For a conceptualization of such practices of
“stigmatization” as a fundamental purpose of international criminal law, see
Frédéric Mégret, Practices of Stigmatization, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287, 288 (2013).
255
Timothy Snyder, It Can Happen Here, SLATE (July 12, 2019, 12:11 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/07/holocaust-museum-aoc-detentioncenters-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/8TEH-5MEX].
256 Id.
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As Snyder puts it, “‘never again’ becomes its own opposite: ‘It can’t
happen here.’”257 Analogy, in other words, is a type of justification.
Invoking a chilling illustration, Snyder explains how Nazis lured
famished Jews to the killing with rolls and jam; for its own part, “ICE
used doughnuts to lure hungry migrants to a place where they could
be arrested, seizing mothers and leaving children behind.”258 The
bottom line: “While that is not exactly like using marmalade to lure
Jews to the Umschlagplatz . . . . The same kind of mind drew
suffering people with sugar in 2018 as in 1942.”259 Such analogies
drive anti-impunity, old and new. If we decided to criminalize
atrocity back then, perhaps we must act now as well; if trials were
what we did back then, perhaps it is not foolish to push for trials
now, as well. That does not mean that the two historical conditions
are the same. Nor does it suggest that the United States is engaging
in a policy similar to Nazi extermination. But it does mean that the
two instances fall within a category of violence that should be
rejected altogether.
The anti-impunity skeptic will still raise a legitimate objection.
There is a world of difference, they will say, between using analogy
as a call for political action (as Snyder does), and the retributivist
conclusion that one “must punish.” Can putting more people in
prison ever be a progressive solution to anything? Perhaps not a
solution. But as long as we have prisons, let them be filled with
those who have committed the worst of crimes, instead of with
migrants and refugees.
b. Structural Violence
For Engle, one of the main problems with criminal law is its
focus on individuals. 260 Perhaps the major strand of critique
directed at anti-impunity argues that this preference for individuals
occludes larger systemic issues, which can then go unaddressed.
Individualizing responsibility may serve to distract advocates from
deeper social-economic hierarchies, structural discrimination on

257
258
259
260

Id.
Id.
Id.
Engle, supra note 4, at 1120–22.
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racial or other grounds, or colonial subordination.261 If one focuses
on individual heroic acts in the face of atrocity, they become more
likely to forget that the actions or omissions of individuals are
shaped by social conditions. The underlying social conditions
should therefore be at the center of transformative political
programs. Criminal law is ill-suited for the task.
This critical tradition, too, emerged long before the human rights
turn to criminal law. While Moyn opposes Arendt in his critique of
anti-impunity, 262 Engle relies on Arendt’s exact same work to
explain this second point.263 She thus quotes Arendt’s observation,
once again in the context of the Eichmann trial, that “we convince
ourselves that if we remove the bad actors, we deal with evil.”264
And indeed, Arendt’s 1963 book, Eichmann in Jerusalem, is one of the
most influential analyses of structural violence in twentieth century
social thought. 265 The book’s famous subtitle, referring to “the
banality of evil,” has preoccupied generations of commentators.266
It captures how the most atrocious violence can be structurally
embedded in the social norms we live by. Blaming a few defendants
for the violence of an entire society may therefore be an exercise in
self-deception. Engle follows Arendt in her argument that in
obscuring state responsibility, international criminal law misses the

261 See, e.g., Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence, Health, and International Law,
22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 61, 77–86, 101–02 (2008) (observing that international law has
transformed from understanding violence against women as primarily individual,
to conceptualizing it as a way in which they are structurally subordinated to men).
262
See Moyn, supra note 9, at 70–72.
263
Engle, supra note 18, at 44.
264
Id.
265
See ARENDT, supra note 238.
266
Id.; see, e.g., Peter Burdon, Gabrielle Applyby, Rebecca LaForgia, Joe
McIntyre & Ngaire Naffine, Reflecting on Hannah Arendt and Eichman in Jerusalem: A
Report on the Banality of Evil, 35 ADEL. L. REV. 427, 429–32 (2014); Shoshana Felman,
Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the Redefinition of Legal
Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 465, 467–72 (2000);
Stephan Landsman, The Eichmann Case and the Invention of the Witness-Driven
Atrocity Trial, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 69, 70–72 (2012); cf. DAVID CESARANI,
BECOMING EICHMANN: RETHINKING THE LIFE, CRIMES, AND TRIAL OF A ”DESK
MURDERER” 4 (2006) (arguing that Arendt’s thesis about Eichmann’s ordinariness
was to a large extent “predetermined and mythological”); DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT,
THE EICHMANN TRIAL 165 (2011) (criticizing Arendt for discounting the evidence
about Eichmann’s centrality in plotting the genocide); BETTINA STANGNETH,
EICHMANN BEFORE JERUSALEM: THE UNEXAMINED LIFE OF A MASS MURDERER xxiii
(2014) (according to which, in the many years of controversy surrounding Arendt’s
book, it has “served to distract us from the matter at hand”).
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ways in which bureaucracy functions.267 Does this critique of the
criminal law apply to the new anti-impunity?
For Engle, the structural violence that criminal law fails to
address is intertwined with the violence of economic inequality.268
She develops her critique focusing on attempts to address systemic
human rights violations through criminal law. She highlights a
relationship between criminal law and economic policies that result
in gross domestic inequalities: “Given that neoliberalism depends
upon and reinforces criminal law, in part to protect private property
rights, the cards are stacked against any attempt to use criminal law
to challenge neoliberalism.” 269 She thus suggests that tax law,
corporate law, and private law generally, may be better suited than
criminal law to counter inequality both on the domestic and on the
global levels.270 Thus, for example, Engle observes that despite the
ICC’s mandate to grant compensation to victims, criminal law is illsuited for such economic remedies: “Given the selectivity of
criminal prosecutions, the granting of these types of reparation is
relatively arbitrary.” 271 Alongside a co-author, Helena Alviar
García, Engle argues that, in the Colombian context, “the campaign
against impunity might have displaced concern for the structural
causes of violence and the need to address them deliberately and
explicitly.”272
In the context of armed conflict, both Engle and Moyn have
accused anti-impunity of an agenda of “humanizing war,” which
has allegedly displaced a broader program of ending war. 273 A
similar concern has often arisen in my mind in the migration context.
Might focusing on the torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment of migrants end up simply advancing safer and “better”
migrant detention facilities? In both cases—war and migration—the
concern is that identifying and insulating instances of gruesome
violence helps normalize a structurally violent system. It is
Engle, supra note 17, at 44.
Id. at 46.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Alviar García & Engle, supra note 34, at 233; see also Natalie Sedecca, The
‘Turn’ to Criminal Justice in Human Rights Law: An Analysis in the Context of the 2016
Colombian Peace Agreement, 19 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 315, 315-45 (2019) (discussing the
turn to a focus on criminal prosecution and custodial sentencing in international
law).
273
Engle, supra note 4, at 1101–02; Moyn, supra note 9, at 73–74.
267
268
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imaginable that a program of “prosecuting ICE,” even if carried
forward, will serve to penalize “bad apples”—low-level agents who
may themselves be victims of an economic elite.274 Higher-ranking
state officials, including Donald Trump -- or indeed Joe Biden -would remain off the hook.
Moving to another example from the European context, it is hard
to question the value of work such as performing rescue at sea.275 In
some ways, these are direct descendants of the sanctuary tradition
invoked above.276 Their focus on saving lives is common to some of
the efforts that laid the groundwork for criminalization, or those that
made criminal allegations. Think of Heller and Pezzani’s reporting
on the organizational and personal intentions that lead to omissions
of rescue;277 and of an argument such as one raised by Shatz and
Branco, namely, that omissions of rescue constitute a crime against
humanity.278 A legitimate question is whether liberal policymakers
in Europe may not harness such arguments in a policy ultimately
designed to save migrants and asylum seekers precisely in order to keep
them off of European soil.279 This indeed may be a fair description of
long-held aspirations among centrist policymakers, seeking to more
effectively “externalize” European border controls.280 According to
such a plan, people would be saved and immediately sent to a safe
location outside Europe, where they may nevertheless not be able to
realize a life worth living. The sea would be territorialized: a
watery, porous sea border would be replaced by a much “harder”
one, perhaps relying on the help of drones and other surveillance
technologies.281 This may not be an advantage from the standpoints
of those who want more open borders.282
274
See Itamar Mann, Hangman’s Perspective: Three Genres of Critique Following
Eichmann, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 652 (Kevin Jon
Heller et. al. eds., 2020).
275
See UN Special Rapporteur Attacks “International Regime of Impunity” Over
Migrant Deaths, supra note 40.
276
See Falk, supra note 50.
277
See Heller & Pezzani, supra note 145.
278
See Shatz & Branco, supra note 153.
279
See Kalpouzos & Mann, supra note 123.
280 See supra note 94.
281
See Daniel Howden, Apostolis Fotiadis & Antony Loewenstein, Once
Migrants on Mediterranean Were Saved by Naval Patrols. Now They Have to Watch as
Drones
Fly
Over,
GUARDIAN
(August
4,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/04/drones-replace-patrol-ship
s-mediterranean-fears-more-migrant-deaths-eu [https://perma.cc/BW47-JKG9].
282
See Mann, supra note 51.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/3

2021]

Border Violence as Crime

727

But such a critique of migration anti-impunity may miss some of
its specificity. In the migration context, the turn to criminal law was
also an attempt to shed light on the role of for-profit corporations in
border violence.283 This is reflected clearly, I believe, in the Article
15 submission that GLAN and the Stanford clinic submitted to the
ICC prosecutor, directed at the complicity of the Spanish company
Ferrovial.284 We have also seen, in the Australian context, that the
turn to criminal law came alongside a use of tort law in a class action
alleging that such firms are liable for crimes against humanity. 285
These intersections of criminal law with tort law go beyond a simple
retributivism and are self-consciously designed to achieve material
results through criminal law alongside other legal disciplines. In
other words, criminal law is merely one aspect of a multi-pronged
program that is, ideally, very cognizant of the need to address
“structural” problems. Ultimately, what is needed is a pluralist legal
strategy in which different areas of law complement (rather than
displace) each other.286
The way in which torts claims can build on an allegation of
crimes against humanity has been demonstrated most vividly in the
Australian case of Kamasaee v Commonwealth.287 As Gabrielle Holly
explains, allegations against the companies that facilitated detention
in Manus and Nauru were framed in negligence.288 Yet they
mirror the matters relied on in NGO reports alleging
contraventions of IHR [International Human Rights] law and
those relied on in the Communiqué [The Stanford/GLAN
Article 15 Communication] to support the views of its authors
that the Australian Government and its corporate contractors
could be prosecuted for crimes against humanity.289
283 See Ioannis Kalpouzos, International Criminal Law and the Violence Against
Migrants, 21 GERMAN L.J. 571, 585–88 (2020).
284
Achiume, supra note 56.
285
Gabrielle Holly, Transnational Tort and Access to Remedy Under the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Kamasaee v Commonwealth,
19 MELB. J. INT’L L. 52, 53-54 (2018).
286
See Barrie Sander, History On Trial: Historical Narrative Pluralism Within And
Beyond International Criminal Courts, 67 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 547, 548 (2018);
Nikolas Feith Tan & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, A Topographical Approach to
Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Migration Control, 21 GERMAN L.J. 335,
336 (2020).
287 Kamasaee v Commonwealth (2016) 52 VR 368; Holly, supra note 285.
288
Holly, supra note 285.
289 Id. at 70 (footnotes omitted).
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In other words, the international criminal law allegations formed a
basis for the tort claim and lent it some weight. The Kamasaee case
surely secured an economic remedy, which is what, for Engle, is
missing from anti-impunity initiatives. On June 7, 2017, the parties
settled for a sum of 70 million Australian dollars (around 47 million
U.S. dollars),290 97 percent of which had been disbursed to victims
by April 2018.291 This was “the largest human rights class action
settlement in Australian history.”292
As Holly emphasizes, this economic remedy did not put an end
to the structural issues the case sought to tackle. The very fact the
case was settled meant that underlying matters of Australian
liability were not decided: “[T]he settlement means that there is still
no clarity regarding the legal limits on how Australia is entitled to
conduct its offshore detention centres, and what its corporate
contractors may do to facilitate its policy.”293 Similarly, the case did
not remove “the veil of secrecy that remains draped over the
offshore detention centres.”294 While I agree with Engle entirely that
economic remedies are crucial in order to address structural
violence, they do not suffice. There is a certain residue of structural
violence in eschewing accountability, and a massive lack of
transparency, which tort litigation may be amenable to. Countering
these outcomes in a continued struggle may mean doubling down
on the international human rights law and international criminal
law strategies, not least because they involve non-Australian
forums. Australian courts, even while facilitating an economic
remedy by way of settlement, have gone a long way to defend an
accountability gap and executive interests, such as secrecy.
Further, the interface between criminal law and private law is
rooted in the intellectual sources of the new anti-impunity. The turn
to criminal law in the migration context reflects, at least in part, a
concerted effort to redirect earlier anti-impunity campaigns precisely
towards more structural issues. Think, for example, of the relatively
early conceptualizations of “state crime” in the Australian context.295
The term, at least initially more conceivable in criminology than in
290
291
292
293
294
295

Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 81 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 82 (footnote omitted).
See Green & Grewcock, supra note 64.
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law, arguably invited the development of a doctrinal space between
the international law of state responsibility and criminal law. This
was directed to the protection of the world’s poorer populations—
those who typically cross borders in an unauthorized way.
The work Ioannis Kalpouzos and I did on “banal crimes against
humanity” shared a similar agenda.296 Responding to the Arendtian
framing that had also preoccupied Engle, we chose a different
direction. Rather than developing an argument against criminal
law, we tried to develop a set of criminal law tools that would
overcome a shortcoming of the discipline and capture structural
violence. 297 Like the “state crime” paradigm, Albahari moves
between notions borrowed from criminal law and an analysis of
structural violence.298 As reflected both in the academic work and
advocacy in all three regional contexts discussed above, the category
of “deterrence” emerged ostensibly as a form of governance for
large scale populations. Recontextualizing it as amounting to
criminal activity is perhaps the boldest and most important
collective contribution of the new anti-impunity to a struggle against
structural violence.
On a higher level of generality, the new anti-impunity is aimed
directly at global structural issues, primarily global redistribution
and decolonization.299 No less important is the basic effort to simply
terminate wrongful activity, which is as much a remedy of human
rights law as it is a remedy of criminal law. Considering the jus
cogens of the new anti-impunity, one might better think of the project
as one of abolishing certain forms of border violence, not necessarily
imprisoning its perpetrators.
While ambitious programs for global redistribution of wealth
have largely failed, one avenue for such redistribution that has
arguably been more successful is the bottom-up efforts of migrants.
Moving and working across borders, citizens of impoverished
countries have managed to send considerable remittances home.
Often exposed to slave-like conditions in difficult jobs such as
agriculture, they have nevertheless been able to positively influence

See Kalpouzos & Mann, supra note 123.
Id.; see also Mann, supra note 30.
298
See Albahari, supra note 138, at 22.
299 Cf. E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509
(2019) (arguing for a different theory of state sovereignty, which affects economic
migrants).
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the GDPs of their countries.300 Rather than direct transfers of wealth,
migrants, both authorized and unauthorized, have arguably been at
the forefront of a struggle against global inequality.
For some left-leaning critics, this contribution to reducing global
inequality may be associated with a contribution to domestic
inequality. 301 According to such a position, a freer movement of
labor, often alongside lifting trade barriers, has resulted in an
increased vulnerability of workers more generally. The latter
proposition is probably the most important challenge to left-leaning
advocates working for porous or open borders. Yet we believe there
is no necessary zero-sum game in which granting opportunities for
workers from abroad means disempowering domestic labor. The
aim to criminalize border violence should come hand in glove with
a concern for redistribution of wealth and particularly for labor at
home. Moving to de-colonization, Tendayi Achiume has provided
perhaps the most compelling account. For her, such a bottom-up
movement of migrants also helps redefine formerly colonial
societies, in a way that reflects their debts to former colonies.302
Taking these background conditions into account, the work of
advocates engaging in the new anti-impunity can be conceptualized
in terms of increasing the costs of border enforcement. Even if the
campaign results in improved detention conditions, such
improvement may end up being of use for global redistribution
and/or decolonization “from below.” The hope is that if one
renders border violence more tolerable, this will indirectly facilitate
a measure of freedom of movement. And freedom of movement
may be the most effective and appropriate way of addressing certain
kinds of global structural violence that have proven particularly
intractable otherwise.

300
See, e.g., Muhammad Azam, The Role of Migrant Workers Remittances in
Fostering Economic Growth: The Four Asian Developing Countries’ Experiences, 42 INT’L
J. SOC. ECON. 690, 690-705 (2015) (examining the economic impact of migrant
workers on economic growth in four developing countries).
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See Ravi Kanbur, Globalization and Inequality, in HANDBOOK OF INCOME
DISTRIBUTION 1845 (Anthony B. Atkinson & François Bourguignon eds., 2015)
(focusing on the discussion in section 7 on remittances and inequality).
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c. Law and Politics
In a closely related point, Zinaida Miller observes that “antiimpunity is a kind of anti-politics.”303 Miller’s sentiment may at first
blush ring true about the new anti-impunity. Think again of
Patronaggio’s investigation against Salvini for “kidnapping.”304 As
illustrated by the Italian Senate, if voters are not in line with antiimpunity agendas, their representatives will quickly render futile
any appeal to criminal law.305 Anti-impunity advocates hopeful of
torture prosecutions against George W. Bush’s national security
team saw a similar dynamic even after Barack Obama’s election.
Obama had suggested his administration would consider such
prosecutions, but once in office came nowhere near them—
presumably wary of their political unpopularity.306 Threatening to
prosecute where it is politically unpopular is a risky thing to do. It
may be likened to pointing an unloaded gun at one’s enemy.
Further, the rhetorical appeal of mass atrocity may invite a robust
and destructive political backlash—something Obama may have
sought to prevent, and that Salvini has embodied.
For
consequentialists who seek to better defend human rights, a political
backlash is surely another harm that should be forestalled.
Seemingly apolitical appeals to criminal law may play in favor of
popular leaders aiming to score points against the rule-of-law
bureaucracy.
Turning to a criminal law vocabulary may be perceived as a way
of avoiding the more difficult conversation: why, in the first place,
are migrants and refugees presently exposed to such horrid
conditions in so many parts of the world? What are the pragmatic
solutions that can be offered to help them? While the enforcement
of national borders in many parts of the world surely depends on
horrible violence, it is unclear that we know how to do away with
them. In the face of intensified migration due to climate change,307
Miller, supra note 18, at 160.
See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
305
See Vampa, supra note 148.
306
Adam Serwer, Obama’s Legacy of Impunity for Torture, ATLANTIC (Mar. 14,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/obamas-legacyof-impunity-for-torture/555578/ [https://perma.cc/4EEK-L9DT].
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the concerns citizens have for their own security are ever more acute;
translating them to worries about migration is sometimes
understandable. Taken together, these arguments seem to indicate
that the new anti-impunity—from Andrew Wilkie to Kamala
Harris—is deeply misguided. At best, the new anti-impunity is a
vanity project, helping citizens of rich countries alleviate their guilt.
At worst, it scares the political center away from accepting policies
that may help to welcome migrants and refugees.
Whether anti-impunity is a kind of anti-politics in other areas, I
don’t know. Whatever the answer, it seems to me the evidence
above illustrates beyond any doubt that during the last decade and
a half, the new anti-impunity has developed as part of a wider
progressive agenda. The place where this is clearest is in the United
States, where calls for prosecuting border control agents have been
a component of an ascending popular movement, and its loudest
proponents have been politicians on the left wing of the Democratic
Party. Far from simply mobilizing the courts against the elected
government, people like Zephyr Teachout, Alexandria OcasioCortez, and others have made anti-impunity arguments as part of a
strategy designed to win votes.

d. (Re)Writing History
A fourth critique Engle directs towards the turn to criminal law
in human rights focuses on how the trend has resulted in trials being
imagined as forums for writing history.308 This concern, which is
also traceable back to Arendt, 309 highlights the different kinds of
burdens, mainly procedural and evidentiary, which prosecutorial
and historical research must lift. When a criminal trial is understood
to generate a historical record, the latter is tainted by the
peculiarities of criminal law. Such a history may lose its critical role,
and simply become subservient to political ends. 310 If, as Moyn
remarks, mass atrocity trials are almost invariably “political

See Engle, supra note 4, at 1126–27.
See Arendt, supra note 238.
310
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trials”;311 and if—as has arguably often been the case at least since
Nuremberg—such trials advance “victors’ justice”; then it seems to
follow that the history produced by mass atrocity trials will not only
be politically tainted, but also will be a history from the point of view
of victors.
Anti-impunity has often arisen in the context of societies in
transition. Criminal trials have thus been advanced as an
instrument of transitional justice. As such, they are supposed to
help a society heal from a history of atrocity, restore relations
between its factions, and begin anew. The role of criminal trials in
writing history is closely linked to this transition. Generally, the
court is expected to help narrate a history that the new society can
accept as its own. This may be accomplished through the creation
of a documentary archive, the hearing of victims and witnesses, and
ultimately by the writing of a judgement. The court may further
design punishments in a way that reflects the values a new social
contract aims to espouse. Criminal trials, in their transitional justice
mode, have a constitutional role.
Migration anti-impunity has hardly culminated in trials. What,
if any, can be its role in a project of transitional politics? Might one
be able to imagine migration anti-impunity as having such a quasiconstitutional role? A possible answer is provided by one aspect of
migration anti-impunity I have not discussed thus far: peoples’
tribunals. Peoples’ tribunals aiming to assert a measure of
accountability for the violation of migrant rights have often taken on
the form of criminal prosecutions.312 As Dianne Otto has remarked,
such tribunals amount to “[i]mpunity in a [d]ifferent [r]egister.”313
These peoples’ tribunals are attempts to rewrite history, in a way
that would help imagine an international society in which certain
categories of border violence would cease to exist. Imagine what a
world without torture or inhuman and degrading treatment of
migrants would look like. Let’s assume we could still have national
borders between states, if perhaps more porous ones. How would
they work?
Thinking through such questions requires us to partake in
drawing an alternative world history, in which the history of
Moyn, supra note 9, at 72.
See Dianne Otto, Impunity in a Different Register: People’s Tribunals and
Questions of Judgment, Law, and Responsibility, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN
RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 291, 294; see also Byrnes & Simm, supra note 152, at
11.
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migration is part of a larger history of political and economic
liberation. Shrugging away the needs of strangers and simply
“letting them drown” becomes unconscionable. 314 When borders
can no longer inflict violence on persons, the result is likely a world
of much greater movement across borders; and much greater
cooperation between states to facilitate orderly movement, both on
bilateral and multilateral levels. But from our present perspective,
it is hard to say much more.
This is as far as one can get from a victor’s history, and we are
still far from winning. The history also does not fall into a naïve or
apolitical humanitarianism. The object is not only to protect
migrants’ bodies, but to engage in a utopian exercise in which
barring border violence is only a first step in a much larger project:
a new constitutional identity that would buttress an entire
transformation of societies and economies in ways that would
render such violence unnecessary to begin with.
V. CONCLUSION
Calls to criminalize border violence, through domestic or
international mechanisms, have appeared around the world. This
Article has juxtaposed such calls with a trend in human rights
scholarship, namely the critique of anti-impunity discourse. I dealt
with critiques according to which “the turn to criminal law” in
human rights has: (1) lacked justification; (2) ignored structural
violence; (3) inappropriately depoliticized human rights; and (4)
misguidedly encouraged the appeal to criminal law as a forum for
writing history. I have done so relying on an account of the
emergence of anti-impunity in the context of migrant struggles
around the world, focusing on Australia, Europe, and the United
States.
The critical trend has revealed important limitations of criminal
law orientations to human rights in war and under authoritarian
government. Yet its authors’ arguments are often overly broad
when examined in the migration context. The new anti-impunity
has, to some extent, evolved precisely in order to respond to points
such as those the critique has raised, from within the vocabulary of
314
See Naomi Klein, Let them Drown: The Violence of Othering in a Warming
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criminal law. This is crucial, because it is often possible to avoid the
pitfalls of criminal law while not entirely doing away with the
opportunities for advocacy that it offers.
A possible objection to my approach is that I have narrowed the
critique of the turn to criminal law and not treated all of its different
angles. This is to some extent true. Karen Engle, Denis Davis,
Zinaida Miller, and the authors they have brought together do not
take into account the perspective of global migration law.315 This is
understandable, as migration is arguably still a small part of the
broader anti-impunity discussion. But this is also not true about the
entire universe of critical voices. Janie Chuang, who also advanced
a critique of the turn to criminal law, closely considered migration
issues, focusing specifically on human trafficking.316
Chuang favors a labor law perspective, and emphasizes the
political ambiguousness of criminalization efforts, which has often
been unhelpful. Yet she interestingly takes a more nuanced
position, which does give room for criminal law measures:
Although criminal justice approaches have (rightly) received
much criticism, crime-control concerns have elevated the
issue of trafficking to one of international and national
concern . . . when pursued in a victim-centered, rightsprotective
manner,
criminal
justice
interventions
unquestionably offer much-needed accountability and
restitution for egregious wrongs.317
Following her cue, I have offered a criminal law approach to
border violence that takes criticism on board and is part of a wider
variety of legal and political strategies. This Article thus aimed to
contribute to a pluralist literature on transnational strategic human
rights litigation. 318 What I have called “the new anti-impunity”
reflects a sustained attempt to respond through criminal law to
structural violence directed by rich states against citizens of poor
states and at the fault lines between rich and poor states. This turn
to criminal law in the protection of refugees and migrants is still
315
On global migration law as a disciplinary framing (which this Article has
aimed to contribute to), see Jaya Ramji-Nogales & Peter J. Spiro, Introduction to
Symposium on Framing Global Migration Law, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 1 (2017-2018).
316
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318 Cf. Tan & Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 286 (advocating for a multiprong accountability approach to address human rights violations in migration
contexts).
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rather inchoate. Advocates can and should continue to internalize
the critique, adjusting their agenda accordingly and in real time,
rather than ignoring it.
In the United States context, the United States Supreme Court’s
decision on Hernandez v. Mesa could have far-reaching implications
on the level of impunity that the U.S. legal system tolerates. As has
been the case with earlier precedents, a U.S. Supreme Court decision
on this issue would have transnational and global ripple effects.319
If there is one critical point that I believe is important to take
rather seriously, it is the critique of the ICC as the forum for the new
anti-impunity. The more specific critique directed against the ICC,
rather than against the criminal law more generally, may justify a
turn away from that forum. The ICC has been sluggish and
ineffective in many other areas, and at present, it is hard to imagine
how it will become useful here. I have emphasized an instance in
which a submission we have made regarding the Australian
situation has later been useful for a domestic class action. That is a
success of sorts in breaking the silos between criminal law and torts.
However, without a change in how the ICC selects its cases, it is hard
to imagine that such initiatives will be very helpful. The work to
push a criminal law orientation on the domestic sphere may be
harder. One practical insight that may be drawn from the critique
of anti-impunity is that it may ultimately be more important to push
criminal law on the domestic sphere than the international one.
By way of conclusion, I would like to highlight a slight discord
between the title of this Article and its body. The former refers to
impunity, a condition in which legal accountability for human rights
violations is absent. The latter mainly discusses anti-impunity, a
legal and social movement, and a political critique that has been
marshaled against it. This slight discrepancy is intentional and
signals the underlying normative motivation for writing. Rather
than examining the rhetoric of anti-impunity as disinterested social
inquiry, the Article has attempted to consider that rhetoric in order
to improve the instruments of a struggle for accountability.
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